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Abstract 
As one of our nation's top critical infrastructures, telecommunications is an 
essential element of many aspects of our lives upon which we, as a society, are becoming 
increasingly dependent.  Computers, digital telephone switches, and interconnected 
information technology (IT) systems impact finances, travel, infrastructure management, 
and missions of national defense.   
This research examined whether the trend in increased outsourcing of information 
technology systems is a significant contributing factor to a reportedly increasing amount 
of insider attacks.  In light of changing social, global economic, and technological 
conditions, the paradigm in which risk analysis, management practices, and operational 
and personnel security practices are applied to protect information has shifted over the 
last decade.   
A comprehensive model of the discursive nature of the insider threat in the 
outsourced IT environment was developed using a qualitative grounded theory approach 
put forth by Glaser and Strauss in 1967.  The theory generated by this research suggests a 
multidimensional real and growing threat resulting from outsourced IT as well as 
preconditions for continued future growth of the insider threat phenomenon.   
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OUTSOURICING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE INSIDER THREAT 
I.  Introduction 
Information Technology 
The nation's eight critical infrastructures as outlined in Executive Order 13010, 
which established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, are: 
“telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, 
banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including 
medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government.” (Executive Order 
13010, 15 July 1996).  All of these functions are strongly dependent on information 
technology (IT). 
Recent reports in the government as well as the private sector focusing on 
information assurance topics specifically mention the insider threat to information, 
implying the extensiveness and prospective trend in proportional insider threats as a 
result of increased contracting out of IT functions.  This research strove to determine 
whether existing data supported reported rises in security incidents from the trusted 
insider.  Reports demonstrating the vulnerabilities of sensitive or critical information and 
associated systems are clear indicators that the insider threat trend is worthy of thorough 
investigation.  Furthermore, this research attempted to increase awareness in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and stress the importance of monitoring and managing the 
insider threat issue to ensure the security of this nation's IT infrastructure and defense-
related information systems. 
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Background 
The potential tragedy from ill-meaning insiders with access to sensitive, critical, 
or classified information, especially with respect to national security and IT infrastructure 
and systems, is a growing concern in the government.  The threat from the inside is now 
often considered as dangerous (Money, 1999), if not more so than the external intruder 
(Denning, 1999).  However, in this age of contracting out IT, interconnected systems, 
global economy, and asymmetrical nature of threats imposed by increasing anti-
American sentiment, security and the now looming threat of the insider – “protecting 
information systems from accidental or intentional unauthorized access, disclosure, 
modification, or destruction” (Loch, 1992, p. 173) may need to be in the forefront of the 
outsourcing process.  This research addressed IT outsourcing from the perspective that 
the outsourcing trend is growing, and now, more than ever, evidence is pointing to the 
growing threat of the insider.  Outsourcing is traditionally “…motivated by the promise 
of strategic, economic, and technological benefits” (Lee 1999, p. 36) however, the surety 
of the IT that permeates business and society must be preserved when considering 
outsourcing decisions. 
Research Question 
 With the increase in outsourcing Air Force infrastructure operation and 
maintenance activities (phone switches, communications centers, computer networks) has 
there been a corresponding increase in malicious insider activity?  Has outsourcing and/or 
use of commercial services in AF information technology contributed to a rise in insider 
threat-based security incidents? 
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This topic, especially in light of recent events concerning our national security, is 
deserving of analysis with respect to insider threat vulnerability.  Due to the highly 
technical nature of the Air Force and the other services it is desirable the results of this 
research will be generalizable to the entire DoD.  Implications for this research apply not 
only to telephone switches (maintenance, operation, central office, and cable plants) and 
network control center (NCC) operations, but computer systems involving intelligence, 
classified, critical mission, personnel, or infrastructure-based data within the Department 
of Defense. 
The specific question to be explored in this research focused on the purported 
increase in insider-related security incidents since 1990.  This time period is chosen for 
several reasons: the end of the Cold War, force restructuring and military personnel draw-
downs, phenomenal growth of the Internet and interconnectivity, global economic 
expansion of the networked business environment, as well as a noted increase in the 
outsourcing of government functions.  Consequently, has there been a trend in increased 
insider security incidents in the last decade as a result of outsourcing information 
technology considered non-core functions? 
The IT Outsourcing Trend 
 The concept of outsourcing technologies and services is not new, and as 
information technology (IT) continues to permeate nearly every aspect of business (Clark 
et al., 1995) and society, it can be expected that these services will also succumb to 
outsourcing practice.  In fact, as the complexity and cost of information-based technology 
continues to increase, the trend to outsource is rising as well (Cheon et al., 1995; Clark et 
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al., 1995; Klepper and Jones, 1998).  Agencies trying to keep up with the latest 
technologies may not have the ability in-house to provide the high- level IT support 
necessary to remain competitive.  
Examples of IT services subject to outsourcing include: system and network 
operations and administration, software support, programming, and infrastructure 
management (Cheon et al., 1995; Antonucci et al., 1998).  Proponents of IT outsourcing 
practice tout the many advantages of contracting out those highly technical services, first 
and foremost, cost savings and profit. 
With the financial aspects of outsourcing being the bottom line for many major 
management decisions, IT services included, theoretical approaches to this concept have 
been primarily from an economical standpoint.  Private industry and the government 
practiced outsourcing throughout the 20th century.  However, the powerful dynamics of 
highly technical information systems have dramatically changed the speed, manner, and 
protocols by which business is accomplished, and these dynamics of technology have 
imbedded their fundamentals into societal norms.  The psychological, social, and 
organizational implications unaccounted for in traditional outsourcing theory were 
explored in this research, particularly where modern technology is concerned 
The Insider Threat 
 The insider threat is an emerging topic in information systems literature, 
however, it was also a major of concern with the nuclear materials management 
environment in the 1980’s.  There were 35 Nuclear Materials Management conference 
papers and journal articles found that were written between 1980 and 1989 that addressed 
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the emerging threat of the insider.  In contrast, there was found only one information 
technology article during this era - Keough’s Inside Job Security Management, February 
1989, that addressed the insider threat.  The point here is the concept of insider threat was 
being examined as an emerging problem just before the information technology 
explosion of the decade to follow.  It’s interesting to note the concerns of the authors 
such as “…trends in insider activity, the characteristic of the insider, and what actions 
have been undertaken by the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and some of our 
licensees to counter the insider threat” (Quinn, E.A., 1983).  Another well-published 
author on the subject states, “…attention is shifting toward achieving comparable 
protection against insiders.  Since threats and protection measures for insiders are 
substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are 
needed” (Al-Ayat et al., 1986).  The protection concerns of nuclear materials from insider 
threats during the era of nuclear proliferation parallel today’s threats from the insider 
during an age of potential information warfare.  The warfare tactics and the associated 
literature domains may have shifted focus, however, the original threat from the insider is 
still a phenomenon worthy of examination.   
 
Meet the Insider 
In her 1999 book titled Information Warfare and Security, computer security 
expert Dr. Dorothy Denning, dedicates an entire chapter, named “Behind the Fence,” to 
the gravity of the internal threat.  This chapter begins with the following statement: 
Insiders - employees and others in trusted positions within or with an organization - 
are generally regarded as the greatest threat to an organization's information 
resources.  This is not surprising, as they have the greatest access to information 
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within the organization.  They could exploit information resources for personal gain 
or sabotage computer systems for revenge.  They could unintentionally reveal secrets 
to contractors, partners, customers, or outsiders requesting information. (p.131)  
 Other definitions of insider with respect to information technology: 
• “Anyone who is or has been authorized access to a DoD information system 
whether a military member, a DoD civilian employee, or employee of another 
Federal agency or the private Sector” (IPT, 2000, p. 3). 
 
• “Employees, contractors, service providers, or anyone with legitimate access 
to a system.  All insiders have some degree of physical or administrative 
access to IS [information systems]. The greater the individual's knowledge of 
and access to the system, the greater the potential threat from that person, with 
individuals having privileged access posing the greatest potential threat” 
(NTISSC, 1999). 
 
• “Include not only employees (current, former, or temporary) of the computer 
owner but also persons providing software (e.g. suppliers) and maintenance 
services to the systems (e.g. consultant or independent contractors)” (Zaiton, 
2000, p. 106). 
 
 
The Risk 
Outsourcing IT risks that have been addressed in literature include: loss of control 
and flexibility (Lacity et al., 1995; Antonucci et al., 1998; Tayntor, 2001); costs (Clark et 
al., 1995; Grover et al., 1996; Antonucci et al., 1998); service quality (Grover et al., 
1996; Klepper and Jones, 1998); and technological or competitive advantage (Cheon et 
al., 1995; Clark et al., 1995).  As the outsourcing trend increases (Clark et al., 1995; 
Klepper and Jones, 1998; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000; Sherwood, 1997), and IT 
becomes more critical to business and society as a whole (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002), 
it is a logical assumption that the insider threat will increase as more outsiders gain inside 
access to an organization’s information and associated technology.  This risk has been 
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underestimated and only until recently (late 1990s) has literature begun discussing the 
insider threat as a growing concern in outsourced IT. 
There existed further opportunities and justification to investigate with increased 
scrutiny the risk the insider threat poses to system security as the outsourcing trend 
continues to increase.  Risk analysis should play a tremendous role as society becomes 
more conscious of security.  Placing quantitative values on information resources or 
considering transaction costs of strengthening corporate information assurance programs 
will more likely become more commonplace in decision analysis of IT outsourcing.  
Dieter Fink attempted to present a framework for examining “loss of security and control 
when IS [information systems] outsourcing occurs…” (1994, p. 3) and addressed levels 
of controls and other necessary considerations that if ignored, could have possibly 
irreversible and costly impacts on core processes, resources, and finances.  He further 
states the simple fact that “…a major concern of the vendor is processing efficiency 
(maximizing output and minimizing costs) while for the client it is systems integrity.  
Controls for the latter add overhead to information processing” (1994, p. 7). 
Even when a company has controls in place, sometimes the risks are unavoidable.  
A disturbing notion is generated by an annual survey accomplished by the Computer 
Security Institute and the FBI, now in its seventh year.  After surveying over 500 
computer security specialists each year, it was concluded that an alarming number of the 
unauthorized access and misuse incidents detected were from insiders: 40 percent in 
1997; 44 percent in 1998; 55 percent in 1999; 71 percent in 2000; 49 percent in 2001; and 
38 percent in 2002 (Power, 2002).  Furthermore, a recent Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO) report on the top grossing government technology contractors stated, 
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“the government continues to do business with companies that repeatedly violate the laws 
and regulations…” (2002, p. 4). Therefore, if it is now known that our some of our most 
frequently used, highly technical contractors have been historically misleading the 
government, is it illogical to assume that contracting out something as critical as IT may 
not place the DoD's information and infrastructure in the most secure hands?   
According to a recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report: 
DoD has conducted the largest competitive sourcing program in the federal 
government, and is planning to compete 15 percent of those positions not deemed 
inherently governmental by 2003. Competitions are spread out over a wide array of 
military base functions, including communications, computing, and maintenance and 
repair. (OMB, 2002, p.8)   
Without regard for the law how important is security policy to the companies 
landing high-dollar contracts?  There are many questions motivating this research and a 
strong belief that there is evidence the insider threat (contracted and otherwise) is real, 
and is increasing in the DoD.  
Scope of this Research 
This research focused on the insider threat with respect to information technology 
that is contracted out by the DoD.  By studying any data that was made available over the 
past 10 to 12 years that could have possibly helped determine whether there is a trend in 
rising security incidents from the inside, it generated valuable recommendations that may 
help refine government acquisition, personnel security, and operational procedures to 
ensure information systems and infrastructure are not at an increased risk for sabotage, 
infiltration, or compromise. 
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Summary 
This chapter introduces a hypothesized relationship between the insider threat and 
the outsourcing trend.  It gives an overview of theorized justification to aggressively 
confront the current threats to DoD information techno logy with respect to today's 
asymmetrical warfare realities.  Finally, by analyzing outsourcing philosophy, the trend 
in outsourcing information technology, and the growing evidence of the insider threat, 
Chapter One is the foundation for this research endeavor. 
Chapter Two covers related work and research domains impacting outsourcing 
and the associated insider threat, as well as how this research differs from previously 
existing work.  Chapter Three defines the research methodology and discusses how this 
thesis addresses a relationship between an increase in outsourcing and increased insider 
threat security incidents.  Chapter Four presents an analysis of available data for this 
research and summarizes the results of the study.  Chapter Five examines the model and 
emerged theory while comparing against an actual high-profile insider threat case.  
Finally, Chapter Six provides a conclusion and presents recommendations and 
possibilities for future work in this area. 
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Little peer-reviewed literature addresses the insider threat, especially with respect 
to outsourcing.  However, due to the timeliness and relevancy of this topic in modern 
Information Technology (IT) culture, literature from related fields was reviewed.  What 
emerged was a comprehensive data mine of theory, cases, testimony, and literature that 
gave this research a rich, multidimensional perspective from which the insider threat can 
be studied. 
Insider Threat Trend in Literature  
Common occurrences were noted in the existing, limited literature referring to 
aspects of the insider threat (human, computer use, or general threat-based) and indicated 
that the insider threat situation was either the most significant threat facing today’s 
information systems, or an increasing problem.  An initial analysis was performed to see 
what data was actually provoking the impression that the insider threat was, indeed, 
increasing.  It was interesting to find that many sources based their statements on one 
primary source of reference, which is the Annual FBI/CSI Survey, now in its 7th year.  
Schultz (2002) points out in A Framework for Understanding and Predicting 
Insider Attacks: in spite of the “belief that ‘most attacks come from the inside’ 
…empirical statistics and firewall logs show otherwise” (p. 1). 
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Table 1 summarizes references to the severity or increasing trend in insider threat, 
based on the statistical information put forth in the annual survey.   
Table 1: Literary References to Insider Threat Trends 
 Reference Year  Increasing Threat Greatest/Most Serious Threat 
Peters, 1999 1997, 
1998 
“Defense officials are increasingly 
concerned about trusted employees 
seeking restricted data.”  
 
“We are increasingly concerned 
about those who have legitimate 
access to our networks – the trusted 
insider” 
“I cannot emphasize strongly enough 
the seriousness of the insider threat to 
our information systems, and through 
those systems, our department’s 
operations” (Quote in the article by 
Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre). 
NTISSC, 
1999 
1998 “The modern trend of outsourcing 
and the use of Commercial-off-the-
Shelf (COTS) products have 
dramatically expanded the pool of 
insiders, giving third parties access to 
hardware and software at many 
lifecycle points.” 
“While government IS face a variety of 
threats from a variety of sources, the 
greatest potential threat comes from 
insiders with legitimate access to those 
systems.” 
Zaiton, 2000 1998 “Despite increase in the threat to 
computer systems from external 
hackers, particularly the internet, 
insiders provide the other likely 
source of threat, which suggest that 
there is a general trend of increasing 
in harm both from outside of an 
organization as well as from within.” 
 
“Unauthorized modification or 
deletion of data or causing damage to 
the organization computer network is 
one of the alarming trends of the 
insider cyber vandalism which is 
becoming a concern for 
organizations.” 
“Insiders pose enormous legal dilemmas 
for their employers who have to decide 
how to deal with threats or harm arising 
from computer misuse.” 
 
“Insider threats, which are not new, 
have a considerable potential scale of 
harm and wide ranging 
implications…may not only affect the 
operational efficiency of the company’s 
computer system as a whole, but may 
also threaten the existence of the 
organization.” 
NCS, 2000 1999, 
2000 
“The technological, economic, and 
social conditions that have led to 
today’s business environment are 
likely to persist, increasing the insider 
threat and posing new challenges for 
corporate and government security 
professionals.” 
“Because they are familiar with the 
organization, malicious insiders have a 
greater opportunity to do harm than 
outsiders.” 
FBI, 2000 2000 “More companies are reporting 
intrusions.” 
“Disgruntled insider is principle source 
of computer crimes.” 
Magklaras 
and Furnell, 
2002 
2001 “Well documented emerging insider 
threat.” 
“Insiders constitute greater level of 
threat than outsiders because of the 
greater level of knowledge they possess 
about critical components of the IT 
infrastructure.” 
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This research is not intended by any means to discount the merit of the FBI/CSI 
survey.  In fact,  “While some researchers warn that survey data on computer crimes can 
be inaccurate due to unreported or undetected acts, such data are useful in characterizing 
a minimum level of threat and in drawing attention to the problem as a whole” (Shaw et 
al., 1998, p. 3).  This survey has become a consistent contribution to the practitioner’s 
body of knowledge and a constant indicator that the threat is significant and should 
continue to be addressed at all levels of an organization.  Furthermore, according to 
research performed for the OASD/C3I by Political Psychology Associates, Ltd., “Overall, 
case investigators report that the number of computer-related offenses committed by 
insiders is rising rapidly each year” (Shaw et al., 1998).  This trend was reported while 
the FBI/CSI survey was in its second year.  There exist cases clearly demonstrating the 
gravity of the insider threat, however, in the last two years of the surveys, the inside 
intrusions seem to be decreasing, as shown in the following table:  
Table 2: Insider Threat Percentages (Power, 2002) 
Year of Survey Percentage Incidents from 
Insiders  
1997 40 
1998 44 
1999 55 
2000 71 
2001 49 
2002 38 
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The decrease after the year 2000 in the percentage of insider incidents could 
possibly be explained several ways: the proportion of attacks from the outside is 
increasing; insider incidents are not being reported due to perceived risk of appearing to 
have poor security programs or bad publicity; or more insiders are remaining undetected  
(Shaw et al., 1998). 
Therefore, while the primary research area is the insider threat, the literature 
reviewed in the next few sections will focus on information technology environment 
forged by events or conditions such as outsourcing, psychology of the information 
technology professional, and the global IT environment and resulting social and 
economic manifestations.  Their hypothesized relationships to the core category were 
prospected by their impact on the insider threat concept.  The integration of the properties 
for each category is intended to show the driving force behind the perceived increasing 
insider threat to IT within the DoD. 
Outsourcing Theory 
“The predominant reason for outsourcing is to cut operating costs and improve 
efficiency” (Jurison, 1995, p. 239).  Outsourcing theory, as it applies to IT, has been 
studied from mainly economic and strategic management-perspectives, which will be the 
main focus of this section. There has been some examination of IT outsourcing from the 
social perspective as well, however, it is less prolific.  And while outsourcing theory has 
been applied successfully in the past, present day technology brings with it threats that 
may not comprehensively considered by these theories.   
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Outsourcing Decisions 
There are several theoretical approaches to evaluating outsourcing decisions that 
have roots in economic, strategic management, decision and social science areas of study.  
The economic perspectives found to be most common in literature on outsourcing IT are 
the theories focusing on the transaction and agency costs.  Among the most commonly 
found strategic management perspectives are the theories pertaining to resource based 
decisions strategies and the dependency of organizations on others for resources. 
Social Theories 
Theories used to study outsourcing from a social perspective include social 
exchange, social contract, and power-political theories.  However, due to limited 
literature focusing on the social theories that relate specifically to the outsourcing of IT, 
and the scope and time constraints, this review will cover the more commonly studied 
theories.   Social theories have been grounded in other fields of study, such as economics, 
psychology, and sociology (Sun, Lin, and Sun, 2002) and are important, however to the 
insider threat concept.  Psychological and social science perspectives such as include 
trust, employee loyalty (commitment) and psychological cont racts are extremely relevant 
to this study, and were included in this research.   
 
Economic Theories 
 Cost-based outsourcing philosophy accommodates theory based on the belief that 
organizations can lower their production costs by contracting out production-oriented 
tasks to vendors who may be able to perform the labor at a rate that would essentially 
save an agency money (Grover et al., 1996; Klepper and Jones, 1998).  However, for 
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outsourcing to be successful “…the costs of negotiating a contract with a vendor, 
managing the vendor relationship, and making sure the vendor does what the vendor has 
contracted to do…” or transaction costs must not exceed the company's prospective gain 
(Klepper and Jones, 1998, p. 54).  
The government is no different when it comes to economic strategy.  Government 
outsourcing practices can be considered a blend of economic and strategic based 
strategies.  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular Number (No.) A-76 lays 
out government policy for fostering fair and open competition among civilian product 
and service suppliers to the government.  OMB Circular No. A-76 is a basis for sound 
economics for government spending.  By examining the background and general 
philosophies behind outsourcing theory, the reader will gain insight into the economic 
and strategic management theories that have long been the foundation for past and 
present day outsourcing decisions (Levina, 1999).  However, these theories may be 
considerably outdated in present and future conditions requiring more attention to 
security as a priority in the outsourcing decision-making process. 
Two theoretical models commonly referenced in literature are used to understand 
and evaluate outsourcing decisions.  These are the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), 
originally founded by R.H. Coase in 1937 (Cheon et al., 1995; Clemons et al., 1993), and 
the Agency Cost Theory (ACT), proposed by S. Ross in 1973 (Cheon et al., 1995).  Both 
perspectives have their origins in the economic areas of study and have been a focus of 
evaluation as to their appropriateness of outsourcing (Willcocks et al., 1995).  Upon 
closer observation of the two models, it should be clear management decisions to 
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outsource information technology and its intricacies may not be comprehensively 
evaluated by these primarily financially-oriented models. 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
 TCT is a classic model developed more progressively by O. Williamson (Cheon 
et al., 1995; Clark et al., 1995; Clemons et al., 1993; Willcocks et al., 1995).  Cheon, 
Grover, and Teng present the TCT as it applies to their outsourcing perspectives and 
subsequent contingency theory model.  They address the factors to which higher 
transaction costs may be attributed: asset specificity, technology and skills unique to a 
company; uncertainty, driven by market, technology, or economic behavior or trends; and 
infrequency of contracting, brought about by newly-developed vendor relationships.  The 
primary focus of the TCT model is the economic efficiency of the production-oriented 
organization (1995).  Slaughter and Ang also observed trends toward cost-based 
outsourcing as reactions to technological and environmental uncertainties (1996).  The 
emerging risk of internal threat is not mentioned specifically, as literature is only 
beginning to address this reality. 
Agency Cost Theory (ACT) 
The second economic theory gives more insight to risk assessment when facing 
the difficult management decision of whether to outsource information technology.  The 
Agency Cost Theory (ACT), although not as rigorously studied throughout literature as 
the TCT, focuses more on the relationships between the company and the contracted 
individual vendor.  Like the TCT and the evaluation of proposed transaction costs, under 
ACT the agency costs are evaluated; if these costs project a financial savings based on 
expected gain, outsourcing IT is considered a wise management strategy.  
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The ACT, however, gives a broader perspective of possible risks a company may 
encounter, as it observes contributing factors (similar to the TCT's three transaction cost 
factors) that could impact agency costs.  This theory also takes into account uncertainties 
much like the TCT, but differs in that it directly addresses risk aversion.  However, the 
insider threat to information systems and infrastructure is not adequately considered.  
Other factors include: predetermined programmability, if possible, of the service 
provider; possible measurement of future contract outcomes; and the length of the 
agreement (Cheon et al., 1995). 
 
Strategic Management Theories  
The remaining two theories that were reviewed are the Resource-Based Theory 
(RBT) and Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT) that originated in the strategic 
management field of study (Cheon et al., 1995).  They are not studied as intensely as the 
TCT, but give a more asset-based perspective on outsourcing of IT, so they will be 
examined briefly to ensure a well-rounded theoretical perspective. 
Resource Based Theory (RBT) 
RBT philosophy centers on a thorough review of a company's resources (mainly 
firm capital) and outsourcing accordingly, in order to fill gaps in management strategies 
not satisfied by existing resources (Cheon et al., 1995; Klepper and Jones, 1998).  
Strategic management theory appears to review assets and capabilities and may be more 
applicable to IT outsourcing strategy.  Cheon, Grover, and Teng provide an in-depth 
analysis of RBT and its constructs.  They relate to resource specifics, such as uniqueness 
(also noted in ACT), and the ability to not only fill gaps in the existing resource base, but 
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to pull in new capabilities that keep the organization competitive and aligned with its 
strategic goals (1995). 
Other perspective views IT functions and innovation as a source of competitive 
advantage for an organization (Mata and Fuerst, 1995; Claver et al., 1998).  Proprietary 
technology and some technical and managerial skills are examples of valuable IT assets 
from a resource-based perspective.  A manager’s “ability to conceive of, develop, and 
exploit IT applications to support and enhance other business functions” (Mata and 
Fuerst, 1995, p. 498) would place a company in a competitively advantageous position.  
Mata and Fuerst conclude that it is IT managerial skills that “are likely to be a source of 
sustained competitive advantage” (p. 499). 
Technological innovation can be considered a resource if the organizational 
culture is immersed in “innovative attitude” which must be present for successful 
technological development (Claver et al., 1998). 
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) 
The second of the strategic management class of outsourcing theory, Resource-
Dependence Theory, dictates that all companies must inevitably obtain resources from 
outside their organizations (Cheon et al., 1995; Klepper and Jones, 1998).  Lacity, 
Willcocks, and Feeney declared a trend in management attitude to automatically 
outsource highly technical tasks because “…no one in the company has enough technical 
expertise to assess new technologies, they should hand the job over to an outsider” (1995, 
p. 91).  The basis of this theory, according to Cheon, Grover, and Teng  “…emphasizes 
the dependence of organizations on their external environment, provides a useful 
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perspective from which to examine the relationship between an organization's decision to 
outsource IS functions and that organization's effectiveness” (1995, p. 213).   
Review of the historical value of outsourcing theory as it applies to the modern 
day information technology environment led to a presumption that economic and 
strategic management practices do not often have the security interests and risk 
considerations of the systems at the forefront of the contracting process.  It is believed the 
threats are inadequately addressed by theories developed in the early part of the last 
century before computers and interconnected systems were a vital part of business 
practice.  Although a prominent roadmap from prospective outsourcing decision, the risks 
encountered by modern day information technology complicate the outsourcing process 
on many levels – including the human level.  Slaughter and Ang (1995) recognized the 
implications of outsourcing could have social and psychological effects on an 
organization’s workers.  The human factors are examined in the next section. 
Insider Threat – Psychological and Social Perspectives 
Familiarization of classic outsourcing theories with respect to risk analysis makes 
it necessary to also investigate characteristics of the information technology environment 
that relate to the socioeconomic and psychological realms.  A significant portion of the 
risk that an organization entails can be attributed to the human factor.  Often, this may be 
overlooked in the efforts to increase economic or technological advantages, however, 
literature is pointing toward evidence that if personnel security management is not a 
priority, outsourcing efforts may end up costing more in the long run.   
 
 
20 
Profile of Information Technology Professional 
Existing literature by Shaw, Ruby, and Post of George Washington University, 
and Heuer of the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) identify a 
perceivably introverted characteristic of typical IT professionals.  Psychologists believe 
this primary personality trait of information technology professionals is a probable source 
of malicious activity from the inside - especially in the case of the disgruntled IT 
professional.  The personality trait found to be common among analyzed computer 
professionals was that of introversion (Shaw et al., 1999). 
There are several reasons for concern regarding the introverted computer 
specialist.  Introverted computer professionals often relate better to computers than 
people, and become easily frustrated and less tolerant to stress.  Because of inadequate 
skills to communicate effectively, their problems with the organization, boss, or other 
employees are often manifested in the form of computer-based attacks.  The personality 
traits of the modern computer technology professional are found to “...create an increased 
vulnerability to feelings of alienation, disgruntlement and disappointment on the job” 
(Shaw et al., 1999). 
The loyalty of the IT professional to a particular company has come under 
question in literature as computer technology professionals are being paid sometimes 
exorbitant amounts for their skills, and some companies are looking to hire former 
computer hackers.  This mentality, fostered by a narcissistic nature, suggests IT 
employees are more prone to seeking revenge if not treated like (or monetarily 
compensated for) the special, talented, and gifted employees they believe themselves to 
be (Shaw et al., 1999). 
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A recent, blatant example of failing loyalty due to this narcissistic nature is the 
case of a TRW contractor, Brian Regan, who felt that he was worth more for his years of 
service and expertise in intelligence analysis systems than he was being paid.  In an 
attempt to seek revenge for perceived inadequate compensation for his services, Regan 
contacted a leader of an adversarial nation to the United States and offered classified 
intelligence information in return for 13 million dollars.  The letter to Sadam Hussein is 
reproduced in the Superceding Indictment filed 14 February 2002 and states, “I have been 
with the CIA for over twenty years and I will be retiring in two years. I feel that I deserve 
more than the small pension I will recive [sic] for all the years of service at the CIA” 
(McNulty, 2002, p. 8). 
Employee loyalty factors are believed to be cogent contributors to security issues 
of the information technology environment.  Employee loyalty is a multi-dimensional 
interest where IT is concerned, due to not only the introverted, narcissistic nature if the IT 
professional, but the nature of temporary or contracted employees, as well as employees 
of non-U.S. born origin.  These factors are examined in the following sections. 
 
Employee Loyalty 
There are several theories behind why an employee would consider stealing, 
sabotaging, or destroying company information, or abusing information technology.  
First, there is the belief that there are certain psychological profiles typical of information 
technology professional, as outlined in the previous section.  Inherent traits that foster 
illicit behavior, as well as sociological determinants are also believed to be the result of 
increasing downsizing, outsourcing, hiring of more qualified personnel of non-US born 
 
22 
origin, or the trend toward short term versus long term employment (Heuer, 1999).  A 
more simplified approach associated with profit or respect or power (derived from 
hacker-based mentality) has also been proposed.  All of these possible causes can be 
related to the outsourcing trend as IT functions are contracted out to none other than 
hard-core IT specialists. 
Hodson and Sullivan of the University of Texas propose employee loyalty is 
based on “intended continuance and perceived job status” (1985, p. 719).  When applying 
outsourcing philosophy to an employment situation that involves contractor employees or 
a pending contracting-out situations, one can observe a possibly significant source of 
employee disloyalty.  There are numerous documented cases of contractor personnel 
wreaking havoc on a company once they knew their contract was being terminated or 
they were being relieved of duty for other reasons. 
In 1998, in a statement on Threats to the U.S. National Security, Louis J. Freeh, 
Director, FBI, addressed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  In this statement 
he reports, “A large portion of the computer intrusion reports that the FBI and other law 
enforcement organizations receive have at their core an employee, or a former employee, 
who has exceeded his or her access, often in revenge for a perceived offense or wrong” 
(FBI, 1998, p. 12). 
 
Increased foreign influence and growing anti-American sentiment 
There are reasons to infer the increased risk to insider threats based on social and 
economic changes in America and our relationship with other nations.  According to 
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Heuer (2001), there are several factors leading to this belief that the security of inside 
information is increasingly at risk due to foreign influence: 
About half of all the doctoral degrees in physics, chemistry and computer science 
granted by U.S. universities now go to foreign-born students.  One-third of all 
engineers in Silicon Valley were foreign born. This increasing internationalization of 
many high technology fields, combined with the increased number and variety of 
countries conducting intelligence operations against the United States, may increase 
the prevalence of conflicting loyalties. (p. 3) 
While foreign-owned U.S. companies have been awarded highly sensitive or 
classified contracts for software development and communications systems (such as the 
DoD’s Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) (USGA, 1996) 
there are reasons to infer the risk to critical systems from the inside could be increasing as 
well. 
Systemic Review 
In an age of downsizing and retention issues the government has also taken 
economic and asset-based approaches to its outsourcing practices.  OMB Circular No.    
A-76 addresses this in paragraph 5 of its stated policy to “Achieve Economy and enhance 
Productivity, Retain [inherently] Governmental Functions In-House, and Rely on the 
Commercial Sector” (1999).  Faced with competitive sourcing targets of “15 percent of 
all federal jobs considered commercial in nature by the end of fiscal 2003” 
(Peckenpaugh, 2002, p. 1), the DoD faces the challenge of balancing OMB directives 
with mission requirements and national security objectives.  For a job to be considered 
commercial in nature, it would have to not be inherently governmental.  According to 
Peckenpaugh (2001): 
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The definition of inherently governmental work dates to 1966, when the old Bureau 
of the Budget issued Circular A-76.  The circular defined inherently governmental 
functions as being “so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
performance by federal employees.”  This general definition was adopted by the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in its 1992 review and by Congress in 
the 1998 Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) act. (p. 2) 
Amidst changing DoD transformational strategies, it is becoming less clear 
whether Information Superiority objectives can be effectively met through outsourcing IT 
functions.  This section reviews the systemic facets of the personnel, security, and 
computer security relevant to outsourcing IT.  It presents a temporal synopsis of the 
progress and published efforts within the federal government to address the insider threat 
element since the Cold War era.  Historical information and reports published by federal 
government offices addressing issues appurtenant to personnel security reviews of 
contractor personnel, malicious acts from trusted insiders, inefficient security controls for 
contractors, as well as the ever-present foreign interest and espionage concerns were the 
foundation for this information review.   
 
Personnel Screening 
According to a congressional memorandum addressing a March 2, 2001 hearing 
in which a Subcommittee on National Security examined the security clearance 
investigation backlog, the GAO estimated “the DSS personnel security investigations 
backlog for defense, civilian and contractor personnel was approximately 505,000 cases, 
and growing…However, the actual size of the backlog is unknown because DoD and 
military personnel databases cannot provide an accurate count of clearances requested or 
overdue” (DSS, 2001, p. 6).    
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For those unclassified systems, innumerable contractors and subcontractors 
continue to be entrusted with defense technology, information, and infrastructure where 
no definitive screening process currently exists.  Shaw, Ruby, and Post found in their 
study that: 
Many organizations within the critical infrastructure but outside the intelligence 
community have little control over the pre-employment procedures and hiring 
practices utilized by the contractor or consulting group.  This is true even though 
contractors and consultants (and sometimes temps) often have highly privileged 
access to the organization’s information assets due to the increased outsourcing of 
programming and other information technology functions. (1998, p. 5) 
In his Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld addressed insider threat vulnerabilities: 
Transforming the screening processes and reviews to reduce the backlog of clearance 
investigations, conducting vulnerability assessments of critical assets, increasing 
support to counterintelligence and industrial security, as well as leveraging 
technology are key thrusts. (2002, p. 101) 
 
Contractor Trust 
A Project on Government Oversight (POGO) report in 2002 reveals that: 
 The federal government continues to do business with companies that repeatedly 
violate laws and regulations, despite rules specifying that ‘Purchases will be made 
from, and contracts shall be awarded to, responsible contractors only. To be 
determined responsible, a prospective contractor must have a satisfactory record of 
integrity and business ethics’ (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.103(a)). 
(POGO, 2002, p.4) 
Between 1990 and 2002, 43 of the top defense contractors have pled guilty to or 
settled such charges as: 
• “concealment of commissions paid to consultants who helped obtain 
contracts to obtain military sales to foreign governments ... .” 
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• “the information transferred [to the Chinese Government] was 
inappropriate ... and ... there was a serious problem here that information 
had the potential to be used to be applied to missile development.” 
• “Digital Equipment Corporation, which Compaq purchased in 1998, 
[allegedly] inflated its labor costs on a Defense Department contract to 
install computer network equipment ... .” 
• “concealed fraud by a subcontractor.” 
• “Boeing repeatedly exported defense articles and defense services to 
Russia, Ukraine, and Norway without required approval from the 
Department of State.” 
• “...settled allegations that Raytheon charged the Government for costs 
incurred in marketing products to foreign governments.” 
• “... UTC will pay the US $14.8 million for allegedly conspiring to divert 
$10 million in US military aid into a slush fund subject to the exclusive 
control of an Israeli Air Force officer ... .” 
• “Pleaded guilty to 37 felony counts of making false certifications to the 
Department of Defense.” 
• “wrongdoing associated with foreign military sales of radar systems to 
Egypt ... .” 
These examples were extracted from POGO’s (2002) electronic database of cases 
which specifically under the category of Defense cases: 
…involves military contracts and covers such violations and alleged violations as 
fraud, cost and labor mischarges, testing falsifications, kickbacks, and bribery. Some 
of the laws this category covers are the False Claims Act, Truth in Negotiations Act 
(TINA), Arms Export and Control Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Racketeer 
Influence and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, and Wrongful Death suits involving military personnel. (POGO, 2002) 
The top 43 government contractors, because of their large corporate standings, 
received over almost half of the contracts awarded, and since 1990, these contractors 
have paid approximately $3.4 billion in fines, penalties, and settlements.  However, 
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despite the 28 criminal violations and repeat criminal convictions for 4 of the top 10 
contractors: 
…only one of the 43 contractors has been suspended or debarred from doing business 
with the government. This suspension action, against General Electric's Aircraft 
Division, lasted only five days after they pled guilty to diverting millions of dollars 
from the U.S. Foreign Military Aid Program to finance the sale of F-16 engines to 
Israel. (POGO, 2002, p. 1)   
These findings indicate a need for maintaining a list or database of contractors 
and their litigation and criminal history.  There is also a need for the imposition of more 
regular debarment and suspension for contractor misbehavior.   This adds an interesting 
perspective to the outsourcing literature regarding not only procurement practices, but to 
trust and personnel security practices of the contractors handling major defense, network, 
and communications systems.     
 
Addressing Elements Leading to Insider Threat Concerns 
Many government reports focusing on information assurance specifically mention 
the insider threat, implying the extensiveness of prospective trend in increased insider 
threats as a result of increased contracting out of Information Technology.  While the 
government does not realize a central agency or database for tracking insider occurrences 
it has recognized a growing threat in the form of neglect, misuse, or malicious intent, 
such as espionage.  The insider threat trend is worthy of thorough investigation and 
monitoring in the DoD to ensure the security of this nation's IT infrastructure and 
defense-related information systems.  For the purposes of this research, a review of 
information security related reports was established beginning in the late 1980s as the 
Cold War era was winding down.   
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Securing Classified Information 
In 1985, the DoD Security Review Commission assessed the DoD's efforts in 
securing classified information.  While the primary threat then was still the Soviet Union, 
and not so much cyber-based as more current threats, the threat of DoD employees and 
contractors was specifically recognized as a significant problem.   In addition to the 
controlling of classified information, personnel security concerns such as clearances and 
rules regarding violators were also addressed.  At that time stringent policy was in effect 
for uniformed military, but not for civilian contractor security violators.  This report put 
forth recommendations on ensuring contractors were properly cleared, that clearances 
were justified using contract numbers, request for proposal (RFP) numbers, re-justified as 
required, or expired (DoD Security Review Commission, 1985). 
Reporting Requirements 
Ten years later, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 required that an 
annual report to Congress be submitted from the President on the threats to US industry 
resulting from espionage (Section 809b).  This resulted in the National 
Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic 
Collection and Industrial Espionage.  The 1996 update to the NACIC report cited 
statistics from an American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) study that “indicated 
that 74 percent of intellectual or proprietary property losses stemmed from the actions of 
trusted relationships - employees, former employees, contractors, suppliers, and so forth” 
(NACIC, 1996, p. 9).  
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Acknowledging Internet Dependency and Associated Hazards 
In 1996 the focus of DoD computer system attacks was a growing threat from 
external sources, such as hackers.  “There is mounting evidence that attacks on Defense 
computer systems pose a serious threat to national security” (GAO, 1996b, p. 4).  The 
report acknowledged, “that because the U.S. economy, society, and military rely 
increasingly on a high performance networked information infrastructure, this 
infrastructure presents a set of attractive strategic targets for opponents who posses 
information warfare capabilities” (GAO, 1996b, p. 28). 
In 1998, the government's increased dependency on computers was further 
acknowledged as well as a serious deficit in protecting these information resources.  The 
GAO released a report entitled Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical 
Federal Operations and Assets at Risk, identifying Information Systems as a new high-
risk resource (GAO, 1998). 
NIPC Stand Up 
Also in 1998, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was 
established as a result of Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 62 and 63.  These PDDs 
recognized telecommunications systems as a major infrastructure component, as well as 
the threats now facing this nation as a result of rapid technological development and 
interconnected systems.  NIPC's mission is to “serve as the U.S. government's focal point 
for threat assessment, warning, investigation, and response for threats or attacks against 
our critical infrastructures” (NIPC, 1999, p. 7).   
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Addressing the Cyber Threat from the Inside 
In October 1999 NIPC director Michael A. Vatis presented an assessment of the 
infrastructure threat situation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Technology and Terrorism.  In this report the insider threat concern is addressed as the 
“disgruntled insider” being “a principal source of computer crimes,” and follows with 
case examples, including a contractor employee who intentionally deleted U.S. Coast 
Guard personnel records (NIPC, 1999, p. 5). 
Identifying Technology Targets 
Information Systems is listed first on the list of “Most Frequently Reported 
Targeted Technology,” in the 2000 NACIC Annual Report to Congress on Foreign 
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage. The annual summary of components of 
espionage-related threats, which includes signal processing technologies explains the 
threat is not just from foreign governments, but commercial agencies and individuals 
comprised 26 and 32 percent (respectively) of the information systems targeting (NACIC, 
2000). 
DoD Examines Insider Threat 
In 2000, a report dedicated to the insider threat trend further cemented the DoD’s resolve 
to combat the insider threat.  The DoD Insider Threat Mitigation: Final Report of the 
Insider Threat Integrated Process Team was a comprehensive summary of shortfalls in 
lack of data, metrics, and policy in addressing the concern of insider threat activity that 
exists in the DoD.  The agency responsible for the strategy put forth in this document is 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications, 
and Intelligence OASD/C3I.   This report defines an insider as “anyone who is or has 
 
31 
been authorized access to a DoD information system whether a military member, a DoD 
civilian employee, or employee of another Federal agency or the private sector.”  It 
specifically addresses “basic sources” of insider threats (maliciousness, disdain of 
security practices, carelessness, and ignorance pertaining to security policies) (page 6).  
This document has laid out policy and strategic initiatives to address metrics, data basing, 
and further research (IPT, 2000).   
This report was released in between two insider threat workshops, sponsored by 
OASD/C3I and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  These 
workshops in 1999 and 2000 were dedicated specifically to the insider problem 
(Anderson et al., 2000). 
Security Controls in Contracts 
“Six Common Security Weaknesses,” outlined by OMB as “government-wide 
security problems” (OMB, 2001, p.11) were reported in the FY 2001 Report to Congress 
on Federal Government Information Security Reform.  Of note was weakness number 
five, which addressed security issues specifically in Federal IT contracted functions.  
Inspector General (IG) reports indicated weaknesses in the DoD's contracting efforts to 
include “…no security controls in contracts or no verification that contractors fulfill any 
requirements that may be in place” (OMB, 2001, p. 13). 
These reports outlined the threat to DoD systems.  They also construed the need 
for action, metrics, better data, research, and implementation of more stringent operations 
in dealing with the insider phenomenon confronting DoD IT.  Entire organizations, 
workshops, and policy initiatives are working to identify, estimate, track, and reduce the 
potential threats to national security by trusted insiders.    
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However, the reports outlined above only represent the surface of what could 
potentially be an incomprehensible and immeasurable problem, it is important to 
recognize the implications of ignoring the information that has been provided.  The next 
section looks at models that have been proposed to study the components of the insider 
threat. 
Insider Threat Models 
Of the few studies that have been done on the insider threat, very “few empirical 
studies of insider attacks are publicly available to guide approaches to this problem” 
(Schultz, 2002, p. 528).  Some very recent literature has emerged that addressed 
modeling the insider threat from various perspectives.  Whether modeling the insider 
adversary (Wood, 2000) or the prediction of insider attacks (Shultz, 2002; Magklaras and 
Furnell, 2002), all have recognized the importance of the human factors, with different 
emphasis on skills, tools, or personality traits.   
In a report by Anderson, Bozek, Longstaff, Meitzler, Skroch, and Van Wyk 
(2000) resulting from one of the aforementioned workshops focused on Mitigating the 
Insider Threat to Information Systems, a basic insider threat model concept was 
developed.  Experts at the August 2000 workshop dedicated to studying the insider threat 
agreed that although different models will be needed for different situations and 
environments, there should be a basic framework: 
 A comprehensive Insider Threat model would require as a minimum three major 
components. The components are People, Tools, and Environment. The People 
component would include parameters such as human performance, behavior, 
knowledge, and motivation. The Tools component would include all processes, 
automated or manual; procedures; data; computers; and other devices that people 
would use to address or solve the Insider Threat problem. The Environment 
 
33 
component would include those parameters that apply collectively to both People and 
Tools or convey relationships between them. (Anderson et al., 2000) 
Anderson and the insider threat research team included in their “confederation of 
insider models” (2000, p. 23) a macro view model depicting a structure that encompasses 
functions (undefined at the workshop due to time) to determine predictable behaviors or 
conditions.   
 
Figure 1: Required Model Components (Anderson et al., 2002) 
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Figure 2: Model Framework (Anderson et al., 2002) 
These components will be used as a guide to investigate three other models 
recently contributed by researchers: B. Wood’s Insider Threat Model for Adversary 
Simulation (2000), E. Eugene Schultz’s Framework for Understanding and Predicting 
Insider Attacks (2002), and G.B. Magklaras’ and S.M. Furnell’s Insider Threat 
Prediction Tool (2002). 
 
Attributes of the Insider 
Just prior to the insider threat workshop discussed above, Bradley Wood 
contributed the Insider Threat Model for Adversary Simulation (2000) in which he 
captures the attributes of the malicious insider, which is also included as an attachment to 
the after action report from this workshop.  His model is a simple list of attributes: 
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“Access, Knowledge, Privileges, Skills, Risk, Tactics (attack behaviors), Motivation, and 
Process” (2000, p. 1).  Each attribute is given certain characteristics that Wood believes 
simulate actual insider behavior.  For example, under the attribute of Motivation, he 
addresses the expectation that the attacker attempting “force some sort of undesirable 
consequence within an enterprise to forward one of the following goals:  Profit, Provoke 
change, Subversion, Personal Motive” (Wood, 2000, p. 2). 
Magklaras and Furnell give Wood credit for developing “the first comprehensive 
approach for devising a model that simulates the behaviour of malicious insider” (2002, 
p. 71).  Wood’s model is also referenced in Schultz’s accounting for his preparatory 
behavior construct in which attack intentions can be exposed though preliminary 
activities and the “Use of commands such as ping, nslookup, finger, whois, rwho, and 
others” (Schultz, 2002, p. 530). 
 
Potential Indictors of Insider Attacks 
E. Eugene Schultz’s model depicting indicators for predicting insider computer 
attack consists of: Deliberate markers, Meaningful Errors, Preparatory Behavior, 
Correlated Usage Patterns, Verbal Behavior, and Personality Traits.   
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Figure 3: Potential Indicators of Insider Attacks (Schultz, 2002) 
His work states that although the insider attack as not the greatest source of 
computer attacks (due to firewalls put in place to prevent external attacks), it is the most 
successful type of attack (Shultz, 2002).  He also posits that there is no one certain 
indicator for insider attacks, and there are significant differences in the external versus 
internal attack methods due to the human and legal elements of dealing with insiders.  It 
is necessary for traditional crime and computer crime approaches to be enhanced beyond 
generic Capability, Motive, Opportunity (CMO) models and to “reverse engineer” inside 
attackers through profiling (Schultz, 2002, p. 528). 
 
Insider Threat Prediction Model (ITPM) 
Magklaras and Furnell’s model is intended to analyze system activity and a user’s 
logged system behavior cues in order to classify users into the following “main insider 
categories:  Possible Intentional Threat, Potential Accidental Threat; Suspicious; and 
Harmless” (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002, p. 69).  Unlike Wood’s model, which provides 
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a list of attributes to help simulate malicious inside attacker behavior, this one considers 
unintentional misuse by an insider by applying a hierarchy of threat components.  They 
use a mathematical approach to determine values for each attribute and assign 
quantifiable values and adjustable metrics in order to predict the nature or level of a 
potential human threat (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002).   
 
Figure 4: The Three Layer ITPM Function Hierarchy (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002) 
Magklaras and Furnell also reference an Intrusion Monitoring System (IMS) as 
one of their constants and functions; however, the intrusion “records produced by the 
Intrusion Monitoring System ‘Archiver’ module” (2002, p. 73) are part of yet another 
conceptual architecture that is not specified in this literature. This model seemed to be the 
most complicated to operationalize, and requires weighted values for each construct 
(constant).  Also, although the authors claim their model is human centric, the table 
highlighting model constructs shows Schultz’s model to lend a more well-rounded 
account for the human behavior aspect. 
Like the other models, this model has yet to be empirically tested. 
(top level) EPT = Σ Fthreat components ⇒   
 
EPT = Fattrib + Fbehavior + Fimsinfo ⇒ 
 
(second level)  EPT = Crole + Ctools + Chardware + Fbehavior + Fimsinfo ⇒ 
 
(third level) EPT = Crole + Cdata + Chardware + Fknowledge  + Fcontent + Fnetwork + Fimsinfo ⇒ 
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Model Concept Definitions 
Some of the less obvious definitions that reference the People component of the 
insider model are defined below: 
Knowledge – Wood (2000) attributes knowledge to the “both the system and the 
target” (p.1), which includes capability to call upon applications and commands 
indicative of the “level of sophistication of the user” (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002, p. 
73). 
Motivation – A manifestation of many possible emotional needs such as “an 
expression of power to influence events (satisfy a frustrated sense of self- importance), an 
outlet for anger, … a means of revenge, or a source of excitement” (Heuer, 2001). 
Behavior – Characteristics of computer usage patterns, verbal or written 
expressions of anger or hostility, particularly before an attack (Schultz, 2002, p. 530). 
Tactics – Methods used by attacker, which depend on what he hopes to achieve, 
whether it be malicious code, disruption in service, system failure or destruction, or theft 
of information (Wood, 2000, p. 2). 
Verbal Behavior – See Behavior. 
Preparatory Behavior – Behavior that my indicate intentions to attack systems, 
such as information gathering prior to a planned attack (Schultz, 2002). 
Personality Traits – Shaw, Ruby and Post (1998) outlines characteristics found, 
through “psychological assessment of programmers, computer scientists, computer 
graduate students, and systems administrators” (p. 2).  These characteristics, in addition 
to introversion, are “direct implications for risk…including a history of personal and 
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social frustrations, computer dependency, ethical flexibility, reduced loyalty, a sense of 
entitlement, and a lack of empathy” (p. 3). 
Deliberate Markers – Defined by Schultz (2002) as trademarks, obtrusive or 
subtle, intended to “make a statement” (p. 530). 
Meaningful Errors  - Schultz (2002) describes these as mistakes or typos during 
the attack process that can be found in error logs or other evidence. 
Skills – Like knowledge of the system, skills allow the attacker to carry out 
actions based on their expertise within system domains (Wood, 2000) 
Risk – Wood (2000) credits the would-be inside attacker as taking precautionary 
actions through either working alone or being very furtive in his actions so as to avoid 
being caught before the attack as been accomplished. 
Correlated Usage Patterns – Patterns of usage that can be found on several 
systems may indicate intended attacks “such as grep on dozens of systems to search for 
files with particular words in them” (Schultz, 2002, p. 530). 
The constructs of all three models are shown in table three as compared to 
Anderson et al.’s, basic model components.  Although some constructs indirectly address 
components (indicated in the chart by “(X)”) in the text of their work, this table uses the 
original construct names as assigned by the authors.  For example, Wood accounts for the 
major Behavior component under Tactics; Schultz addresses Behavior under basically 
every construct of his detection model. 
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Table 3: Insider Threat Model Concepts 
 
Anderson et al. (2002) describe Organizational Culture under the Environment 
component as the interaction between People and Tools.  A formal definition of 
organizational culture is by Edgar Schein in his book Organizational Culture and 
Leadership: 
                                Author 
Model Construct 
Anderson 
et al. (2000) 
Wood 
(2000) 
Schultz 
(2002) 
Magklaras and 
Furnell (2002) 
Environment     
Organizational Culture X    
Role (w/in organization)    X 
People     
Knowledge X X  X 
Motivation X X   
Behavior X (X) (X) X 
Tactics  X     
Verbal Behavior   X  
Preparatory Behavior   X  
Personality Traits   X  
Deliberate Markers   X   
Meaningful Errors   X   
Skills  X    
Risk  X    
Correlated Usage Patterns   X   
Tools     
Software X    
Hardware X   X 
Cost Benefits X    
Networks X   X 
Computer Environment X    
Privileges  X  X 
Access  X  X 
Process (X) X   
Data (X)   X 
Content (user’s file entries) (X)   X 
Intrusion Monitoring 
Systems (IMS)/logs 
(X)   X 
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The pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, 
developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems. (1985, p. 385) 
This is relevant concerning outsourcing of IT because it is the Environment and 
the Organizational Culture that have given the social perspective as to why organizations 
outsource and the potential affects on workers.  Magklaras and Furnell (2002), although 
having composed a mathematically based model, did, in fact, address all three 
components under the model requirements put forth by the researchers during the insider 
threat workshop.  They did not name Organizational Culture specifically, but did address 
the role of the individual as it applies to his place in the organization “with reference to a 
specific computer system (workstation, server, telecommunication system)…the type and 
level of system knowledge they possess” (p. 64). 
Research Perspective 
The insider threat to outsourced information technology is a phenomenon that is 
not only an observable real-world problem, but it embodies a range of fields of research 
extending from psychology to economic theory.  It is also a research area in which few 
rigorous studies have been done, due to insufficient discernable case data.  Since this is a 
new area study, with no established formal theory, qualitative research methodologies 
were consulted. 
 
 
42 
Qualitative Analysis 
Qualitative research is defined as, “any kind of research that produces findings 
not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification … 
research about … organizational functioning, social movements or interactional 
relationships” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 17).  Marshall and Rossman (1989) guide the 
qualitative process in this case where “research questions explore new territory, previous 
literature and theory may be inadequate for constructing frameworks for study” (p. 38).   
By exploring the insider threat problem from a multidimensional perspective, the 
results of this study are intended to present a case for future data gathering in order to 
monitor insider threat trends.  By reviewing literature from related fields, a conceptual 
framework is developed from “theoretical constructs, categories, and their properties that 
are used to organize the data and discover new connections between theory and real-
world phenomena (Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p. 41).  An inductive strategy for 
generating theory, by allowing it to merge from the data that is collected, is explored 
through grounded theory methodology. 
 
Grounded Theory 
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss put forth an approach known as grounded 
theory that is ideal for researching the insider threat to outsourced IT.  Grounded theory is 
often used as a qualitative methodology is ideal for an inductive analysis for a 
phenomenon for which there is no established, formal theory.  While qualitative strategy 
encompasses theoretical sampling, experiential data, content analysis, literature 
integration, and historical analysis to achieve conceptual density, grounded theory 
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specifically strives to “transcend the literature and synthesize it at the same time” (Glaser, 
1998, p. 120).   
The main thrust of grounded theory is to “Generate Theory that accounts for a 
pattern of behavior which is relevant and problematic for those involved” (Glaser, 1992, 
p. 75; Straus, 1987, p. 34).  The theoretical framework that developed through grounded 
theory begins with categories and properties, as defined in the following set of definitions 
from the varied works of Glaser and Strauss: 
Category – “Stands by itself as a conceptual element of a theory” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, p. 36).  “A classification of concepts” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 61). 
Property – “Conceptual aspect or element of a category” (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967, p. 36).  “The most concrete feature of something (idea, thing, person, event, 
activity, relation) that can be conceptualized, which will allow the order of specificity 
required by the analyst for purposes of his or her research” (Strauss, 1987, p. 21). 
“Attributes or characteristics pertaining to a category” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 61) 
Conceptual Density – “The multiplicity of categories and properties and their 
relationships” (Strauss, 1987, p. 21). 
Hypothesis – Generalized relationships among categories created by comparing 
similarities and differences among groups (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  “A provisional 
answer to a question about a conceptual relationship” (Strauss, 1987, p. 21). 
Core Category – “The central phenomenon around which all the other categories 
are integrated” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 116). 
These concepts typically emerge from reviewing large amounts of literature and 
data that is related to the field of study, when no relevant literature base for the primary 
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area of study (in this case, insider threat to outsourced information systems) is available.  
By taking notes on the data that are then sorted into categories, one can then extract 
properties to determine the conceptual density of the research problem.   
 
Forced and Emergent Philosophies 
From the co-founders of grounded theory, Dr. Barney Glaser and Dr Anselm 
Strauss came two seemingly polar philosophies of doing grounded theory, although their 
original work The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) was a cooperative effort.  While 
the main goal of both methodologies was to generate theory, Strauss takes on a more 
structured approach to categorizing and coding the data.  It is believed this procedural 
approach was to help the research assign scientific rigor to qualitative research 
methodologies.  Strauss (1990) also classifies grounded theory as a qualitative, inductive 
research method; Glaser shows it to be a quantitative or qualitative approach, but still 
inductive in nature, conducive to academic freedom for the independent researcher 
(1998).   
Glaser’s emergent philosophy insists that pure grounded theory is not “forced” 
through rigid classifications, common with other methodologies.  Although still rigorous, 
grounded theory, according to Glaser, allows the researcher to be guided by the data, and 
not the other way around (1998).   
Summary 
This section reviewed the literature pertaining to documented insider threat 
information, proposed models for studying the threat, and perceived trends.  Outsourcing 
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theory literature was also reviewed, as it applied to outsourcing information technology 
and the trends toward this movement.   
The human aspect of the threat, the insider, was reviewed via the results of 
psychological and sociological professionals specifically focused on insiders, spies, and 
computer criminals.  A larger sociological and economic picture was also presented with 
respect to the culture that has been promulgated by information technology, outsourcing 
trends, the global workplace, and information distribution and access.  Employee loyalty 
and ethical flexibility from an individual psychological perspective and a social 
perspective was also reviewed in terms of contracted employment and foreign influence. 
An historical analysis if the government and DoD’s multidimensional efforts to 
address the security and technological issues related to insider activity, malicious or 
otherwise, was presented as a basis for understanding applicability of this research in a 
national security role. 
Finally, an examination of the literature on qualitative research methods and 
grounded theory were reviewed, as these references were the genesis for the alternative 
research methodology used in this study.   
The next chapter presents the methodology used in analyzing available literature, 
reports, studies, and cases. 
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III. Methodology 
“DoD’s strength is our use of information technology; our weakness is our use of 
information technology.”  (Money, 1999) 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters gave an overview of outsourcing theory, psychological and 
social concerns, and security considerations regarding information technology and the 
threat of the insider.  This chapter explains the methodology used in determining whether 
there is a significant relationship between the insider threat and the growing trend of 
outsourcing IT.   
Research Goals 
The primary goal of this research was to determine whether government 
information technology has become more vulnerable to threats from the insider in light of 
contracting information systems operations and maintenance to outside agencies.   
The term insider threat has been used on an increasing basis in government 
testimony by organizations such as the FBI, NIPC, and OSD/C3I.  Task teams and 
workshops have been dedicated to examining the potential threat of the insider. The focus 
of this research was to determine whether the popularity of outsourcing government 
information technology is a contributing factor to the insider threat.   
The motivation for this research was originally the observation of blue suit 
operations that have been contracted out during the last decade of the 20th century.  The 
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drawbacks of outsourcing have been discussed in literature, such as marked reduction in 
quality of service and reduced flexibility (Lacity et al., 1995; Grover et al., 1996; 
Antonucci et al., 1998; Klepper and Jones, 1998; Tayntor, 2001).  The security aspect has 
only been mildly addressed (Fink, 1994) and often, “Unfortunately, risk assessment takes 
a backseat before, during, and after negotiating an agreement” (Kliem 1999, p. 93).  In 
the case of government information technology where missions of national defense are 
concerned, it is believed that the threat posed by the insider has been severely 
underestimated (OMB, 2001).  There is no established process in place or central 
database available to manage these cases, as addressed by the DoD Insider Threat 
Mitigation: Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team (2000).   
Abused or misused system access by the disgruntled or otherwise ill-meaning 
insider has become a purportedly more common occurrence, however, the data to support 
this has been elusive at best.  While the literature review addresses the DoD’s increased 
interest in the insider threat since the late 1980’s, there are apparent significant shortfalls 
in the monitoring and evaluation of security incidents in the contracted information 
systems. 
Assumptions  
1. Information obtained on information technology that has been contracted is 
representative of general government outsourcing of similar systems, unless 
documented otherwise.  
2. Studying the entire DoD outsourcing situation is beyond the scope of this 
research (or availability of data is restrictive in nature).  
3. This research is restricted to information technology that has been outsourced 
which includes, but may not be limited to, telephone switches, network 
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control centers, intelligence data systems, communications centers, or 
communications maintenance activities.  
4. Data has been severely limited or restricted at best.  This in itself is may be a 
possible indication that information on security violations from the inside 
should be more closely tracked. 
5. Available data may be skewed due to the amount of incidents not reported to 
investigative agencies and are handled within the organization. 
Data Availability 
This is a relatively new area of advanced study, therefore, information collection 
was from a variety of sources.  An extensive search effort for data included several DoD 
agencies which took an interest in this topic and had initially offered to contribute their 
limited case data as applicable to this study.  However, currently, no central source of 
statistical case data exists.  According to Anderson et al., (2000): 
Little data exists today specific to the Insider Threat.  What data exists is spread 
throughout many organizations and usually has distribution limitations preventing its 
use throughout the research community.  Furthermore, the depth and breadth of such 
data is inconsistent.  Reference control data is needed for evaluation research, 
progress, and results.  Such data is essential to developing and validating Insider 
Threat models. (p. 25) 
Desired data collected was originally to be based on the following: 
• Number/proportion of outsourced IT functions in the Air Force (telephone 
switches, network activities) between 1990 and 2002 (MAJCOM sources) 
• Date/time period of internal security incident occurrence  
• Outsourcing status of function in question (government, outsourced, or 
pending outsourcing) 
• Nature of occurrence (neglect, misuse, or malicious intent, such as 
espionage, corporate, industrial, or otherwise)  
• Personnel involved (military, civilian, contractor personnel) 
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  Analysis methods would depend on the data collected, but optimally would 
involve regression methods to determine the most statistically significant cause, if 
any, to a rise in insider threat activity.   
Desired preliminary prediction variables were:   
• Proportion of outsourced IT functions AF-wide;  
• Whether incident was action of contractor, civil servant, or uniformed 
military personnel;  
• Whether the activity one of the following: 
• blatant malice (including espionage and any intent to harm national 
security),  
• neglect or abuse (includes disregard for policy and security 
regulations),  
• or misuse (using the systems for other than original intent for 
personal gain, however, without intention to harm the 
government), 
• Other factors applicable to analysis 
Investigative agencies and information operations centers were contacted for case 
data demonstrating security incidents from the inside.  Requests were made for data on 
the base location, nature of incident, and whether the incident was committed by military, 
civilian employee, or contractor, as well as impact (financial or otherwise) on the unit.   
In addition to investigative agencies, stateside major commands and contracting 
sources were contacted for information to determine which bases had outsourced 
telephone switches (operations and maintenance) and network control centers.  A 
database was to be constructed to depict the amount of outsourced functions.  It was 
found that few commands do not outsource their network control centers (NCCs) because 
IT is considered to be a core competency (an inherently governmental function of the 
organization’s mission).  The one definitive discovery was that more than half the 
stateside telephone switches at major installations (38 out of 62) were outsourced.  In 
 
50 
addition, dates reflecting when communications functions were outsourced were 
unavailable for retrieval as major command agencies did not monitor outsourcing dates 
and other data on their bases, and some chose not to release what data they had.   
During the search for data to support this research, it was also found that there are 
no metrics, central databases, or releasable case files for identifying which security 
incidents were committed by insiders.  The Insider Threat IPT of April 2000 has already 
identified this shortfall.   
A very limited number of releasable cases of insider intrusions reported to 
investigative agencies were found.  Managers of operations and maintenance contracts 
also had no security incident records for contractor personnel operating and maintaining 
telephone switches.  Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) in 
Monterey, California has done some research in this area as well, using the limited closed 
case files from the military investigative agencies, although not specifically relating to 
the outsourcing questions. 
Without the data originally required for a statistical evaluation of the outsourced 
information technology situation across a stateside sampling of Air Force bases, the 
quantitative methodology originally proposed was determined to be inappropriate to 
continue research in this area.  However, the information gained from the literature 
review indicates this is still a valid and much needed research endeavor.  Therefore, the 
absence of numerical data forced the research effort to state a revised focus question:   
 
If there is little reliable, detailed data, how is it the threat of the insider is thought 
to be increasing? 
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Qualitative Strategy Formation 
With the lack of data to support this research, it was important to ensure the 
review of the information available on this topic was scrupulously studied to try to 
determine the impact outsourcing information technology has had on the insider threat 
trend that is reportedly on the rise.  
A qualitative approach was decided upon based on this research question 
requiring “the exploration of a process not yet identified and not yet encompassed in 
theory” (Marshall and Rossman, 1987, p. 36).  Although a qualitative analysis 
methodology originally served as an alternative for insufficient statistical data sources, it 
appears to be the most appropriate approach for this topic.  By using methods set forth in 
grounded theory, related research categories emerged from the literature and are 
presented for analysis in Chapter Four.  Academic literature on outsourcing theory, 
psychological typing of IT professionals, as well as sociological aspects of the global 
business environment, including foreign influence and anti-American sentiment was 
consulted.  Literature on employee loyalty and psychological contracts was also 
reviewed.  Furthermore, the systemic domain of personnel security and screening 
procedures and monitoring of contractors and procurement practices that have caused 
financial damage to the federal government added to the subsequent concept that all these 
elements are interrelated and present when outsourcing IT.   
This inductive review intends to not only indicate a variety of attributes of 
outsourcing and information technology, but to demonstrate how the interrelated 
elements fully comprise observable patterns of increased insider threat.  By 
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understanding how the combination of these individual components threatens the 
information processed and managed, it may be possible to address the threat, and propose 
an integrated model to support a theory that will provide a case for future data gathering 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1989) and testing. 
Modeling Outsourced Information Technology 
The basis for a proposed model is the interconnecting of the following areas of 
study: outsourcing theory, psychological, socio-economic, and systemic.  Under the 
outsourcing theory purview, traditional economic and strategic management-based 
approaches to outsourcing have been applied by managers since the early part of the 20th 
century.  These approaches are based predominantly on the costs, assets, tasks, personnel 
skills – primarily resources – and the benefits an organization can reap while striving 
toward their goals.  However, these approaches to outsourcing were antecedent to the 
modern interconnected and global environment; outsourcing is often addressed as a 
function of economics first and foremost, with security risks often an afterthought.  
Outsourcing is a business practice now commonly applied to the DoD, including 
information technology operations and maintenance (telephone switches and network 
control centers), which are not considered by some agencies to be core functions.  “In 
addition, DoD has conducted the largest competitive sourcing program in the federal 
government, and is planning to compete 15 percent of those positions not deemed 
inherently governmental by 2003.  Competitions are spread out over a wide array of 
military base functions, including communications, computing, and maintenance and 
repair” (OMB, 2002, p. 5). 
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Building on the outsourcing practices applied to information technology, there are 
socio-economic and psychological factors that apply to the insider threat vulnerability.  
The psychological aspect of the typical IT professional, as defined by employment status 
and length, in addition to observed personality traits is a contributing factor to the suspect 
employee loyalty as a result of a contracted employment situation in a modern, 
interconnected, highly- technical information environment. 
Paralleling the employee loyalty aspect of the temporary employment of the IT 
professional is the foreign influence.  The contracting of sensitive, classified, software 
and information technology to companies owned by foreign countries, coupled with 
increased anti-American sentiment globally, adds an aspect of risk from the inside that 
could be potentially devastating to information systems.  The employee loyalty factor is 
primarily examined under the sociological domain for the purpose of this research, 
however, it has strong connectivity to the psychological perspective where typing of the 
IT professional is concerned. 
Finally, the systemic category observes characteristics of the DoD in which the 
environment possibly fosters the presence of the threat.  The current backlog of personnel 
security clearances and failing of supporting databases are relevant to this research, as 
this shows a significant vulnerability in the clearance process for contractor personnel.   
An important part of this research was the completion of a thorough historical 
analysis of the DoD’s efforts to identify and counter the suspected threats posed by the 
ill-meaning insider. Reports presented here add a temporal and historical relevance to the 
evolution of the insider threat concern.   
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Grounded Theory Methodology 
The topic “insider threat,” as it applies to information technology and 
outsourcing, is a relatively underdeveloped classification of study in academic literature.  
As this research has shown, there is very little data to accommodate whether the insider 
threat is a growing problem.  However, there is a strong belief that this threat is real, 
growing, and should be a national security concern.  This belief is grounded in the study 
of aforementioned categories that appear to be interrelated.   
Qualitative strategies, grounded theory in particular, were called upon due to the 
complex social relationships forming in this research area.  This methodology provides 
grounds for future data collection (Strauss, 1987) that may be generalizable to the entire 
DoD IT outsourcing process.  By demonstrating the interrelationships and overarching 
properties of sampled research domains (categories), conceptual density is achieved from 
which a theory can be generated. 
Chapter Four will give an in-depth analysis of the theoretical connections between 
the following categories and their substantive properties.  The analysis will show that in 
this particular application of qualitative research, the data that was gathered is used to 
develop a theory as opposed to testing it (Glaser, 1998). 
The data were analyzed using a form of open coding methodology to identify 
categories and properties that classified the research areas.  A form of axial coding was 
considered to make “connections between a category and its subcategories” (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, p. 97).  Finally, selective coding techniques describe the relation of the 
core category (insider human threat) “to the other categories, validating those 
relationships” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 116).   
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Weaknesses 
This methodology’s primary drawback is in the data is that no statistical data was 
available for this analysis.  While investigative sources are concerned about the insider 
threat, their limited case data did not reflect what they believed was the true magnitude of 
the problem.   
Another limitation was some significant contention in the grounded theory 
literature between the founders (Anselm Strauss and Bernard Glaser).  Sources by both 
authors were used and the result was a combination of their methodologies.  The 
emergent philosophies of Glaser are evident in the reformation of the research question as 
more categories emerged from the literature review process.   The structured approach of 
Strauss was used in leveraging the four main categories to form a conceptual model.  
Therefore, the inductive, qualitative analysis developed in this work may be considered a 
merging of emergent and forced philosophies.  
Surveys 
Surveys are tools that may be used by social scientists to measure perceptions on 
the insider threat.  However, “are of little value for examining complex social 
relationships or intricate patterns of interaction” (Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p. 85).   It 
was determined this was not the best approach for this particular topic.  This is a 
controversial topic of discussion among communications professionals; the 
communications community has essentially been bombarded by surveys from other AFIT 
and organizational endeavors.   Furthermore, the complex social relationships explored in 
this research require much more time, permission, and sensitivity than the scope allowed.   
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Summary 
This chapter reviewed the methodology used in determining relationships 
between categories of literature and information relevant to investigating the insider 
threat to outsourcing and information technology. 
The next chapter gives an analysis of the information and presents the cross-
connected categories and properties.  A model is then constructed operationalizing the 
relationships and constructs generated by the analysis. 
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IV. Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the more complex research problem generated in 
Chapter Three: If there is little reliable, detailed data, how is it the threat of the insider is 
thought to be increasing?  By exploring the data related to outsourcing, insider threats, 
and information technology (literature, cases, articles, testimonies, and reports) a 
framework is constructed that shows the logical connections behind this statement. 
Research Elements 
The concept of the insider threat is composed of several components.  First, there 
is the outsourcing theory aspect.  In attempting to develop an outsourcing philosophy for 
the federal government, economic goals and strategic management issues regarding 
manpower prevailed.  It was believed that money could be saved and highly technical 
skill-sets could be acquired by seeking help from outside organizations.  However, by 
studying models put forth by economic and strategic management theorists with regard to 
information technology, one observes the models do not address modern concerns of risk 
analysis to include the fiscal and operationa l aspects of accounting for and recovering 
from threats posed by an unreliable employee. 
While the outsourcing theory aspect of the insider threat model could most likely 
be modified to consider the risks posed by making an outsider an insider, the next aspects 
are psychological and social considerations, some unique to the highly technical fields.  
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These psychological and socio-economic aspects address personality traits observed to 
spawn behavior in computer professionals that could be malicious in nature and 
potentially damaging to an organization.  The socioeconomic perspective investigates 
perceived increases in the global business environment, anti-American sentiment and 
foreign influence, and contracting to foreign-owned companies.  These factors are 
hypothesized to be contributors to decreased employee loyalty. 
In addition to the theoretical and psychological and social aspects of the insider 
threat apparently plaguing information technology, systemic causes, brought about by 
several factors also have an impact.  Military downsizing and trends toward contracting 
out skills that are not seen as inherently governmental add a mentionable burden of 
obtaining security clearances for personnel accessing government facilities and systems.  
The reduced manning in the defense investigative services is now bearing the burden of 
investigating those contractor personnel not formerly possessing clearances.  Given that 
contractors are often responsible for ensuring their subcontractors meet qualifications set 
forth in contracts, the government or hiring agency has no guarantee subcontractors are 
adequately cleared.  Finally, there is an intense backlog in security clearance process for 
the people already cleared and undergoing revalidation.  In the systemic realm, we 
account for inadequate regard for existing security policy, and inefficient monitoring and 
tracking of incidents resulting from the insider. 
 
 Enabler of Vulnerabilities  
Although not implying that outsourcing is inherently corrupt, the initial analysis 
examines outsourcing theory as an enabler of conditions having a potential for fostering 
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vulnerabilities.  These vulnerabilities are created by factors such as existing conditions, 
interactions among actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences (Strauss, 1987) that 
are characteristic of each outsourcing theory’s basic philosophy.  These contributing 
factors were then cross-connected with properties of the other major constructs to show 
interrelationships to the insider threat situation which is assumed to increase with respect 
to scope, severity, and time.  Willcocks and Lacity (1995) summarize these conditions 
and factors in their statement:  
IS outsourcing is different from outsourcing anything else…on five counts:  
(1) IT evolves rapidly; this surrounds IT sourcing decisions with a high degree of 
uncertainty. 
(2) The underlying economics of IT changes rapidly.  Although for example 
price/performance improvements occur in every industry, in few industries do the 
underlying economics shift as fast as in IT. 
(3) The penetration of IT to all business functions is becoming ubiquitous: unlike 
many other products and services IT cannot be easily isolated from other 
organizational functions. 
(4) The switching costs to alternative information technologies and IT suppliers 
are high, and sometimes prohibitive. 
(5) Many potential and actual customers are still highly inexperienced in IT 
outsourcing. This can put them at a significant disadvantage when negotiating and 
running contracts with outsourcing vendors. (p. 206) 
This model also accounts for psychological and social impacts on people and 
organizations as rapid technology proliferation further permeates many aspects and 
dimensions of society.  I found it interesting that the first and second counts relate to 
existing conditions of rapid technological change or information technological trends and 
economic trends.  
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The third count deals with IT and organizational culture, stressing the interaction 
factor, as IT is deeply ingrained in all facets of business and modern society.  Strategies 
are played out in the fourth count listed above when management must make decisions 
based on transaction costs, agency costs, resource gaps, and information technology 
trends.  Finally, consequences of economic and strategic management decisions (to 
outsource some, all, or none of the organization’s IT) can also reflect in organizational 
culture, uncertainty, increased (or decreased) costs, and risks – all properties of the 
category of outsourcing theory. 
The theoretical approaches to outsourcing, as well as the psychological, socio-
economic, and systemic or organizational aspects of the overall insider threat are 
interrelated and overlapping, which makes the problem a multi- faceted threat to our 
information systems, and ultimately, our national security.  These interrelationships are 
found between the categories and properties addressed by the next section. 
Generation of Theory 
The theory generated here was developed through progressive levels of 
perspective, as prescribed by Dr. Barney Glaser in his grounded theory literature.  The 
first level is the data itself, from which emerged the categories.  The essential elements of 
each category were then analyzed for properties describing the event or instance stated or 
taking place in the data, which forms the second perspective level. 
At the third perspective level, termed substantive theoretical level by Dr. Glaser, 
integration takes place as the categories and properties are “sorted into theory” (1998, p. 
136).  The model produced by this methodology bears the relationships between the 
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substantive theoretical codes (categories and properties).   The theory can then be tested 
through applied cases and events (Glaser, 1998). 
Categories of Data 
As mentioned previously, the categories emerged during analysis of the 
information (all of which is considered data), literature, reports, and proceedings relevant 
to the research area of insider threat in the outsourced information technology 
environment.  Each category contained properties that were determined by patterns of 
behavior (in case studies), incidents or occurrences that were interrelated between 
categories.   
By discovering interconnections between these knowledge bases, relationships 
were found that give a multidimensional perspective to what is more than just computer 
crime.  As the information was analyzed, and more was gathered, it was found the insider 
threat research area to be an emergent culture in itself as a result of years of actions on 
the parts of scientists, economists, managers, and social scientists.  Each category 
presented here, along with its associated properties, impacts properties and other research 
areas to feed into a cycle of a phenomenon that is believed to be growing in complexity 
and scope over time.   
The ideas presented in the following sections represent the individual categories 
and their revealed properties.  The properties were then cross-connected to each other in 
an attempt to see whether or not conceptual density was present in the data.  If it can be 
shown that the relationships between these categories are theoretically dense (by showing 
definite interconnectivity among multiple properties), then the proposed model would be 
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relevant, working, fitting, and modifiable (Glaser, 1992) in basic grounded theory form.  
This model could then serve as a multidimensional theoretical demonstration of the 
insider threat phenomenon.  Implications for use of this model will follow in Chapter 
Five. 
The conceptual framework encompasses an explanatory network of forces 
impacting the scope, severity, and complexity over time, and magnified by the events 
posited in each category.  The forces all interconnect to shape and add dimension to the 
insider threat facing our critical information systems and infrastructures. 
Category Analysis 
The elements of each category of reviewed literature were extracted as elements 
that are believed to be contributing factors to the properties composing the each construct 
of the final model.   
Glaser (1998) gives guidance for extracting properties by asking the following 
questions (p. 140): 
1.  What category is indicated?   
2. What property of what category does this incident indicate?  
3. What is the main concern of the participants? 
The categories themselves emerged in the initial search for literature pertaining to 
the insider threat.  From these categories emerged properties that were used to connect 
the categories as model constructs. 
The next four sections gives second- level perspectives of the categories by 
displaying properties believed to best describe each incident.  Most incidents were pulled 
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verbatim from sources cited, to ensure proper context of the author was understood.   The 
elements from the literature were indicative of the more popular theories used to 
speculate on outsourcing IT for the scope of this research.  It was found that costs and 
contractual issues addressed material or resource based business concerns in outsourcing 
more than the behavioral or social issues, such as organizational culture and trust 
concerns with opportunistic behavior.  This is to be expected.  Most outsourcing literature 
pertaining to IT is based on economic and strategic management theories and not social 
theories. 
 
Outsourcing Theory and Principles 
The first category in this analysis examines the theoretical perspectives of 
outsourcing IT and principles laid out in peer-reviewed literature.  This aspect is 
appurtenant due to the conditions that call for a management decision to outsource or the 
resulting conditions brought about by outsourcing.  This decision is brought primarily 
about by cost and resource factors that have been studied heavily in Economic and 
Strategic Management Theory.   
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Table 4: Outsourcing Theory Second Level Perspective  
 
                   Theory of IT Outsourcing         Properties 
Determines most efficient contract (behavior oriented – 
delegates some decision-making authority to the 
contractor) (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Contract Complexity/Length 
Agency Costs 
Uncertainty due to government policies, economic 
climate, technological change influence agency costs 
(Cheon et al., 1995) 
Agency Costs, Uncertainty, 
Technological Trends, 
Economic Trends 
Uncertainty due to environmental dynamics and rapid 
technological change forces firms to focus on core 
competencies (Slaughter and Ang, 1996) 
Uncertainty, Core 
Competencies, 
Technological Trends 
Risk aversion of outsourcing receiver or provider 
influences agency costs (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Risk, Agency Costs 
Programmability determines specified appropriate 
behavior by vendor influences agency costs (Cheon et al., 
1995) 
Agency Costs, Contract 
Complexity/Length, 
Measured Outcomes 
Extent to which outcomes can be easily measured 
influences agency costs (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Measured Outcomes, 
Agency Costs, Contract 
Complexity/Length 
Length of agency relationship (contract) influences agency 
costs (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Agency Costs, Contract 
Complexity/Length 
Primary reference point for outsourcing research literature 
(Clark et al., 1995) Transactions (exchange of 
goods/services) are evaluated for economic efficiency 
(Cheon et al., 1995) 
Economic Trends, 
Transaction Costs 
Uniqueness/specificity of hardware, software, and skills 
increase transactional relationship with contractor (Cheon 
et al., 1995) 
Core Competencies, 
Transaction Costs 
Uncertainty conditions (unpredictable market, 
technological, economic trends, contractual complexity, 
quality of outputs) increase transaction costs (Cheon et al., 
1995) 
Uncertainty, IT Culture, 
Economic Trends, 
Transaction Costs, Contract 
Complexity/Length 
Infrequency of contracting due to initial building of 
relationships with new contractors increase transaction 
costs (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Transaction Costs, Contract 
Complexity/Length 
Implies more likely (and natural) opportunistic behavior 
on the part of the vendor, thus increasing transaction costs 
(monitoring behavior) (Clark et al., 1995; Jurison, 1995) 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs 
Outsourcing is done to fill gaps in information systems 
resources and capabilities (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Resource Gaps  
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Information systems capabilities include information 
quality, staff, support, cost effectiveness) (Cheon et al., 
1995) 
Resource Gaps  
Resource attributes include value to the firm, uniqueness 
to the firm, non-substitutable by competing firms, and not 
imitable by other firms (Cheon et al., 1995); these 
attributes provide competitive advantage (Mata and 
Fuerst, 1995) 
Core Competencies, 
Resource Gaps 
All organizations depend on resources from other 
organizations for survival (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Resource Gaps, Resource 
Dependency 
Relationships in task environments (concentration, 
availability of scarce resources, and interconnectedness) 
impact resource dependent outsourcing strategy (Cheon et 
al., 1995) 
Resource Gaps,  
Resource Dependency 
Resource dimensions (importance, discretion over use, 
and control over resource) impact resource dependent 
outsourcing strategy (Cheon et al., 1995) 
Resource Dependency, 
Resource Gaps 
General Resource Theory – Intangible resources are 
information based; technological innovation and culture 
are resources. (Claver et al., 1998; Mata and Fuerst, 1995) 
IT Culture, Organizational 
Culture 
General Resource Theory – Technological innovation can 
be considered a competitive resource if it has large R&D 
department, infrastructure, and strong corporate culture. 
(Claver et al., 1998). 
IT Culture, Core 
Competencies, 
Organizational Culture 
Outsourcing relationships with high uncertainty, high risk 
aversion, low programmability, low outcome measures, 
and longer relationships have highest agency costs (Cheon 
et al., 1995) 
Uncertainty, Risk, Contract 
Complexity/Length, Agency 
Costs, Measured Outcomes 
Keeping technology up to date, emerging technology 
(Antonucci et al., 1998; Grover and Ramanlal, 1999 
Tayntor, 2001) 
Technological Trends, IT 
Culture, Resource Gaps, 
Transaction Costs 
Costs and benefits of worker employment environment 
(Slaughter and Ang, 1996) 
Organizational Culture, 
Agency Costs, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships 
Competition and Cost Savings (Antonucci et al, 1998) Economic Trends, Resource 
Dependency 
Access to variety of new resources, skills, technology 
(Lacity and Hirschheim, 1994; Antonucci et al., 1998; 
Jurison, 1995; Slaughter and Ang, 1996) 
Technological Trends, IT 
Culture, Resource Gaps 
Internal IT departments viewed by some managers as 
archaic, expensive, unmanageable (Antonucci et al, 1998) 
Technological Trends, IT 
Culture, Transaction Costs 
Loss of control, flexibility concerns (Antonucci et al., 
1998; Tayntor, 2001) 
Risk, Disaster Recovery, 
Contract Complexity, 
Measured Outcomes, 
Agency Costs, Uncertainty   
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Vendor use of subcontractors (Antonucci et al., 1998) Risk, Contract 
Complexity/Length 
Measured Outcomes, 
Agency Costs 
Displacement of employees, layoffs (Antonucci et al., 
1998) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Organizational Culture 
Impact of outsourcing on IT security and control (Fink, 
1994) 
Risk, Agency Costs, 
Disaster Recovery, Contract 
Complexity/Length, 
Measured Outcomes, 
Transaction Costs 
Risk management must be practiced when negotiating 
outsourcing agreement (Kliem, 1999) 
Risk, Disaster Recovery, 
Contract 
Complexity/Length, 
Measured Outcomes, 
Transaction Costs, Agency 
Costs 
Assumes humans cannot achieve complete contracts, due 
to inability “to forsee complexit ies and contingencies in 
contractual relationships” (Jurison, 1995)  
Contract 
Complexity/Length, 
Transaction Costs, 
Uncertainty, Risk 
Assumes “decision makers are rational people who adopt 
organizational forms that best economize on transaction 
costs” (Jurison, 1995) 
Transaction Costs, Risk 
Cost benefits are easier to determine (vendor proposals) 
than risk (many components and dimensions) (Jurison, 
1995) 
Transaction Costs, Risk 
Dynamics of IT skills market (shortage skills, rapid 
technological change) (Levina, 1999) 
Resource Gaps,  
Technological Trends, 
Economic Trends,  IT 
Culture 
 
An interesting observation was made here due to speculated strong social and 
psychological emphasis on the insider threat core category.  The vulnerability enabler of 
outsourcing theory addressed by a hypothesis: Applications of traditional outsourcing 
theory to IT inject uncertainty into the organizational environment and downplay human 
factors indicative of technological culture, thus increasing potential for insider threat.   
The “hard” line of business (profit) is often the first consideration when it comes to 
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outsourcing, therefore counterbalancing security, and increasing potential for adverse 
insider behavior.  The effects of information technology and global society on the 
organizational cultural, social, relationship, and behavioral aspects of outsourcing 
transactions are deserving of more significant study in order to reduce potentially 
vulnerable IT to the insider threat. 
The category properties of IT Outsourcing Theory are summarized below:  
Table 5: Outsourcing Theory Properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing Theory 
Transaction Costs 
Agency Costs  
Contract Complexity /Length  
Risk  
IT Culture  
Resource Gaps  
Measured Outcomes  
Technological Trends  
Economic Trends  
Uncertainty  
Resource Dependency  
Core Competencies  
Disaster Recovery  
Organizational Culture  
Employment Conditions/Relationships  
Opportunistic Behavior  
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Psychological Impact of Outsourcing Information Technology  
“The new information and communication technologies are generating not merely 
new patterns of work but also new methods of deviancy in the electronic work 
environment” (Zaiton, 2000, p. 111).  
This section examines the psychological perspectives as they relate to the 
information technology environment as outsourcing becomes more prevalent.   It is 
becoming evident that information technology is not just a function or service, whether or 
not it is considered an organization’s core competency, to be added to a list of chores to 
be contracted out, such as trash removal or grounds maintenance.  Information 
technology, as stated earlier, impacts many dimensions of our society, an organization’s 
culture, and the minds and motivations of those people who work there.  Unfortunately, it 
is often not easy to evaluate all the risks when considering the impact of maintaining an 
edge in comes managing our electronic information. 
Personality traits and loyalty, along with general indicators of our highly technical 
culture, dominated the insider threat and psychological contract literature.  Opportunistic 
behavior, although a major tenet of agency cost theory (which could explain its lack of 
recurrence in other theoretical elements) also occurred in many of the psychological 
elements.  The next table shows second- level perspective of psychological data gathered 
on this category. 
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Table 6: Second Level Perspective of Psychological Category and Properties 
Psychological Elements of Insider Threat            Properties 
Preconditions for insider betrayal influenced by changes 
in social and economic conditions in US and relations w/ 
rest of the world (Heuer, 2001) Increased Opportunity 
Social Trends, Economic 
Trends, Internationalization 
Preconditions for insider crime:  opportunity, motive, 
character weaknesses, triggers (Heuer, 2001) 
Opportunity, Motive, 
Ethical Flexibility, Triggers, 
Personality Traits 
Presence of a subgroup of computer professionals and 
computer science students whose entry into computer field 
was motivated, in part, by frustrations getting along with 
others (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Interpersonal Social 
Frustrations, Personality 
Traits, IT Culture 
Insider betrayal may be expression of power, influence, 
revenge; motivation includes emotional needs and not 
always money. (Heuer, 2001) 
Emotional Needs, Power, 
Revenge, Personality Traits 
Loyalty adversely affected by economic changes 
devaluing long-term employee-employer relationship 
(Heuer, 2001) 
Loyalty, Economic Trends, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships 
Illegal behavior often rationalized by feelings of 
entitlement to better treatment from employer. (Heuer, 
2001) 
Entitlement, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Personality Traits 
Cases reveal complex issues of loyalty in an international 
environment (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Loyalty, 
Internationalization, Ethical 
Flexibility 
Dynamic interaction between vulnerable information 
technology professional (w/ personality characteristics of 
introversion, etc.) and organization and personal 
environment causes potential trigger of dangerous insider 
behavior. (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Personality Traits, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Triggers 
Personality and cultural characteristics of destructive 
insider behavior:  Introversion, computer dependency, 
history or personal/social frustrations (anger toward 
authority), ethical flexibility, mixed sense of loyalty, 
entitlement, lack of empathy. (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Personality Traits, 
Interpersonal Social 
Frustrations, Ethical 
Flexibility, Loyalty, 
Computer Dependency 
Introversion is characteristic of computer technology 
specialists, scientists, and other technology specialists. 
(Shaw et al., 1998)   
Personality Traits, IT 
Culture 
Introversion found to be common trait in every 
psychological assessment of programmers, computer 
scientists, computer science graduate students, and system 
administrators (Shaw et al., 1999) 
Personality Traits, IT 
Culture 
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Subgroups of studied computer users include “computer 
addicted” individuals, prone to share histories of social 
failures and ostracization; computers replace direct 
interpersonal relationships; “more likely to be 
independent, self-motivated, aggressive loners, make poor 
team players, and feel entitled to be a law unto 
themselves” (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Personality Traits, IT 
Culture, Interpersonal Social 
Frustrations, Computer 
Dependency 
Surveyed computer professionals revealed tendency 
toward looser ethical boundaries within the “information 
culture” (if a system is not secure, it is game for attack) 
(Shaw et al., 1998) 
Personality Traits, IT 
Culture 
Reduced loyalty found among programmers and other 
professionals with high demand for services and high rates 
of turnover.  Those identifying more with profession than 
organization prone to more intellectual property conflicts 
involving source code, programs.  (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
IT Culture, Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Current shortage of information technology personnel may 
influence narcissism among older employees who may 
resent special treatment and/or bonuses paid to new hires. 
(Shaw et al., 1998)  
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
IT Culture, Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Narcissistic personality (sense of entitlement) and anger at 
authority common among perpetrators from energy and 
national security infrastructures.  (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
IT Culture 
Organizational commitment pertains to degree of 
identification w/ organization and its goals.  (Millward 
and Brewerton, 1999) 
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
IT Culture 
An emotionally-detached and self- interested employee 
who fails to become integrated into the organization is one 
whose commitments and energies are likely to be focused 
elsewhere. (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) 
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
IT Culture, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships 
Lesser degree of loyalty is anticipated from contractors, 
partners, consultants, and temps due to short term or 
transient nature of employment (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Loyalty, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior 
Study by Millward and Brewerton (1999. p. 266):  Found 
that “contractors (both permanently and temporarily 
employed by the agency) were more likely than 
employees to be transactional in orientation and to hold a 
short term view of their future with the client company” 
Loyalty, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs 
Transactional psychological contracts based on pay for 
short term employment (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) 
(Economic based) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs 
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Findings of 1999 study show it is possible for contractors 
to be integrated in the workplace on a partnership basis so 
long as outsourcing arrangements are strategically 
initiated and managed.  (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) 
Determining Contractor 
Behavior/Authority 
Influences Agency Costs, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs 
A relational psychological contract is more likely to foster 
attachment to employer, not just remuneration-based. 
(Millward and Brewerton, 1999) (Socially based on trust, 
stability, long-term commitment) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs 
Transactional psychological contract characterized by 
short-time frame and attitude of limited organizational 
contribution, low commitment, weak organizational 
integration/identification, attitudes of limited flexibility 
and easy exit. (Millward and Brewerton, 1999) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Length of Employment, 
Opportunistic Behavior, 
Transaction Costs, Loyalty, 
Ethical Flexibility 
 
It should be no surprise that information technology professionals often contain a 
set of personal properties that reflect modern social context in a computer dependent 
environment.  This set of literature studies the human aspect of existing conditions 
pertaining to IT which management should include in decisions to outsource IT.  This 
literature also supports Willcocks and Lacity’s (1995) account of the IT environment 
being a special case when it comes to making outsourcing decisions.  A second 
hypothesis emerged: Psychological aspects, such as typical IT professional personality 
traits of today's information technology employees and employee loyalty, are major 
contributing factors to the potential of insider threat, suggests that there are significant 
factors that must be considered as crucial to the outsourced IT and the insider threat 
phenomenon.   
The properties of the Psychological Factor category are summarized in Table 7: 
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Table 7: Psychological Properties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social and Economic Elements of Information Technology and Outsourced 
Systems 
 This category is primarily described by the properties of internationalization,  
social trends, IT culture, loyalty, and employment conditions/relationships.  Situations 
related to the global economy and increased internationalization include trends such as 
increased business with foreign governments, and an influx of foreign students and 
workers in high technology fields. 
 The second- level perspective of category properties is presented in the Table 8: 
 
 
         Psychological  
Personality Traits  
Loyalty  
Technological Culture   
Employment Conditions/Relationships 
Opportunistic Behavior    
Length of Employment    
Transaction Costs   
Ethical Flexibility  
Interpersonal Social Frustrations  
Computer Dependency  
Triggers  
Economic Trends  
Internationalization  
Agency Costs  
Opportunity/Motive  
Social Trends  
Emotional Needs/Power/Revenge  
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Table 8: Second Level Perspective of Social and Economic Category and Properties 
Socio-Economic Elements of IT Outsourcing Properties 
Technological advances decrease ability to control 
distribution of sensitive information (Heuer, 2001)   
Technological Trends 
Changes in industry have placed personnel involved in 
sensitive military R&D and production in official business 
contact with people in foreign countries that are 
conducting espionage against the U.S.  (Heuer, 2001)  
Internationalization, Anti-
American Sentiment, Social 
Trends, Outsourcing Trends 
Sense of loyalty among employees eroded by: 
downsizing, outsourcing, transferring of jobs overseas, 
restructuring to accommodate global economic 
competition, rapid technological change, increased hiring 
of part time employees.  Decreased Job Security. (Heuer, 
2001) 
Loyalty, Ethical Flexibility, 
Internationalization, 
Outsourcing Trends, 
Technological Trends, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships,  
Cases reveal complex issues of loyalty in an international 
environment (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Internationalization, Loyalty 
Sense of loyalty among employees eroded by: Increased 
internationalization of high tech fields, conflicting 
loyalties due to increased number and variety of countries 
conducting intelligence operations against the U.S. 
(Heuer, 2001) 
Loyalty, Ethical Flexibility, 
Internationalization, Social 
Trends, Anti-American 
Sentiment 
½ of all doctoral degrees in physics, chemistry, and 
computer science go to foreign-born students. (Heuer, 
2001) 
Loyalty, IT Culture, 
Internationalization  
Increased dependence on information systems (Shaw et 
al., 1998; Zaiton, 2000; Magklaras and Furnell, 2002) 
Computer Dependency, 
Technological Trends, IT 
Culture 
Societal trends toward ethical flexibility found by 
researcher to be result of lack of specific computer-related 
ethical training and lack of regulations w/in organizations 
= lax employee ethical attitudes. (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Social Trends, Ethical 
Flexibility, Technological 
Culture 
Societal trends of cross-generational ethical flexibility 
found by researchers to be result of lack of ethical training 
in schools and at home by parents (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Social Trends, Ethical 
Flexibility 
Current controversy over H1B visas, raising of cap, 
unemployment among citizens in high-tech fields, and 
uncounted and untracked laid-off H1B foreigners  
remaining in country (Swartz, 2001) 
Internationalization, IT 
Culture,  Social Trends, 
Economic Trends, Ethical 
Flexibility 
Computer industry implicated in erosion of ethical 
standards (software restrictions, hiring of former hackers).  
(Shaw et al., 1998) 
Ethical Flexibility, IT 
Culture 
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Growing trend is joint ventures between India and U.S. 
computer companies – India supplies U.S. firms with 
UNIX operating systems, motherboards for high-end 
workstations, and complete workstations; U.S. 
government agencies’ software maintenance contracts also 
contain applications written and maintained by Indian 
programmers. (Keeler, 1997) 
Internationalization, Social 
Trends, IT Culture, Loyalty, 
Computer Dependency, 
Technological Trends, 
Outsourcing Trends 
Professional employees tend to be more committed to 
their profession and its values than to their employers. 
(Mueller and Wallace, 1992) 
Loyalty, Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Opportunistic Behavior 
Influx of H1B workers (capped at 115K/year), nearly half 
from country of India  (Ruber, 2000) 
Technological Culture, 
Social Trends, Economic 
Trends, Internationalization, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships 
Influx of H1B workers (capped at 115K/year) divided as 
follows:  54% Systems Analysts/Programmers; 5% other 
IT fields; 5% engineering, 36% other.   (Ruber, 2000) 
IT Culture, Economic 
Trends, Internationalization, 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships 
Job commitment and intended continuance impact job 
commitment.  (Hodson and Sullivan, 1985) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
Loyalty, Opportunistic 
Behavior 
 
Internationalization and loyalty are properties of concern due to social trends.  
These properties not only apply to mixed loyalties between countries of origin and the 
United States, but also between high- tech workers whom believe they are losing work 
and educational opportunities to the foreign markets.  These factors present opportunities 
for insider threats to information technology not just from a foreign source, but a growing 
threat from disgruntled domestic sources as well.  From this analysis comes a third 
hypothesis:  Social indicators such as increased foreign influence and growing anti-
American sentiment worldwide potentially increase the insider threat risk. 
The Social and Economic category properties are summarized in Table 9: 
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Table 9: Socio-Economic Properties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systemic Elements of Outsourcing, Practices, and Insider Threat 
The last category of data analyzed for patterns involves not only managerial 
conditions and effects of decision-making, but operational practices and impacts in 
today’s modern, interconnected, global environment.  The elements that led to the 
properties extracted from this literature, while probably not revelations in the information 
or industrial security fields of expertise, may assist management in future outsourcing IT 
considerations.  It is generally understood that, “You can outsource the work, but you 
can’t outsource the risk,” according to Jay Ehrenreich, senior manager for cyber crime 
prevention and response, PricewaterhouseCoopers (Schwartz, 2003).  Risk is an inherent 
part of any decision-making process. It is intended this analysis will aid in more 
comprehensive risk analysis or threat detection in future outsourcing endeavors.   
      Socio-Economic 
Internationalization  
Ethical Flexibility  
Social Trends  
IT Culture  
Loyalty  
Employment Conditions/Relationships  
Economic Trends  
Outsourcing Trends  
Technological Trends  
Opportunistic Behavior  
Computer Dependency  
Anti-American Sentiment  
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It is also no surprise that access and personnel security practices are perceived to 
be among the top concerns of data elements comprising this category.  IT culture is 
indicative of a society of people dependent on computers and information where loyalty 
and ethical flexibility are now quite logically some of management’s top concerns, 
especially when considering whom will be in charge of an organization’s critical 
information and systems.  Finally, social, economic, and technological trends in the 
environment outside the organization as well as the employment conditions within the 
organization will have significant bearing on how concerned employees will be with 
protecting information. 
The second- level perspective of the systemic category and its properties are 
shown in the next table: 
 
Table 10: Second Level Perspective of Systemic Category and Properties 
  Systemic Elements of IT Outsourcing             Properties 
Major investments are devoted to technology to detect and 
prevent external intrusions; human problem is often not as 
significantly explored. (Shaw et al., 1998)   
IT Culture,  Information 
Distribution, Access, 
Economic Trends, 
Management Practices 
Information Systems are most vulnerable to those who 
know system best (insiders) due to unbalanced approach 
to system security (Shaw et al., 1998)  
Access, IT Culture, 
Personnel Security 
Practices, Management 
Practices 
Background investigations are often higher priority for 
staff employees than contractors, consultants, or 
temporary workers whose roles are more transient and are 
not vetted in organization. (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Access, Information 
Distribution, Personnel 
Security Practices, 
Management Practices 
Cases reveal complex issues of loyalty in an international 
environment (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Loyalty, Internationalization 
Increased dependence on information systems (Shaw et 
al., 1998; Zaiton, 2000; Magklaras and Furnell, 2002) 
Computer Dependency, IT 
Culture, Social Trends 
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Cases reveal high incidence of former employees to be 
insider risk if they retain access (directly - backdoors or 
indirectly - associates); can install backdoor access if 
anticipating termination/layoffs  (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Employment 
Conditions/Relationships, 
IT Culture, Personality 
Traits, Personnel Security 
Practices, Access, Ethical 
Flexibility, Uncertainty 
IT Trend contributed to increased vulnerabilities over last 
decade: “elimination of need-to-know principle” 
(increased information sharing).  (Shaw et al., 1998) 
Information Distribution, 
Access, IT Culture 
Clearance Backlog (DSS, 2001) in Aug 2000 (per GAO) 
for defense, civilian, and contractor personnel was 
approximately 505,000 plus cases.  As of Feb 2001, DSS 
could still not verify number of backlogged cases. 
Access, Information 
Distribution, Personnel 
Security Practices, 
Uncertainty 
Contractor Misconduct (Lunney, POGO, 2002) Top 
government contractors repeat criminal offenses, pay 
approx. $3.4 billion in fines, penalties, however, do not 
get debarred or suspended. 
Outsourcing Trends, IT 
Culture, Personnel Security 
Practices, Access, Ethical 
Flexibility, Management 
Practices 
Briefing memo from J. Vincent Chase preceding the 
hearing on security investigation/clearance backlog, “The 
purpose of a personal security investigation is to 
determine an individual’s loyalty to the United States, 
character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, 
and judgment are such that the individual can be expected 
to comply with government policy and procedures for 
safeguarding classified information” (DSS, 2001, p. 3). 
Loyalty, Personality Traits, 
Personnel Security 
Practices, Access, Ethical 
Flexibility 
Factors affecting clearance granting:  “Allegiance to the 
United States; foreign influence; sexual behavior; personal 
conduct; financial consideration; alcohol consumption and 
drug involvement; emotional, mental, and personality 
disorders; criminal conduct; security violations; outside 
activities; and misuse of information technology.  (DSS, 
2001, p.5) 
Loyalty, Ethical Flexibility, 
Personality Traits, 
Internationalization, IT 
Culture, Access 
 
A fourth and final hypothesis, Systemic factors such as outsourcing trends and 
personnel security practices potentially increase the insider threat, can be indirectly 
supported by the properties that were from all categories of literature.  Outsourcing 
trends, however, are an indirect contributor, as management sometimes has no choice but 
to outsource gaps in resources and capabilities, as stated in Resource Based Theory 
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(RBT).  Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) also claims that every organization will 
need to depend on another for certain resources, skill, or capabilities.  The systemic 
category of information is related to access to critical information and systems, and it is 
only logical to assume that outsourcing a system does increase access and personnel 
security concerns.  
Therefore, the outsourcing trend must be addressed in terms of mitigating risks 
brought about by granting access to outsiders as they become insiders.  This also brings 
the focus of this integration of literature to the workplace within the organization – the 
source of insider access, management practices (whether hiring, outsourcing, or firing), 
and security practices (operational or personnel).  This focus on the organization will be 
shown in the final model. 
Table 11: Systemic Properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Systemic  
Access  
IT Culture  
Personnel Security Practices  
Loyalty  
Ethical Flexibility  
Internationalization 
Social Trends  
Outsourcing Trends  
Employment Conditions/Relationships  
Uncertainty  
Economic Trends  
Management Practices  
Computer Dependency 
Information Distribution  
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Relationships Between Category Properties 
Table 12 gives a concept-centric view of the property relationships.  Tables four, 
five, six, and seven indicate the elements believed to be representative of their respective 
categories.  In showing the relationships between properties drawn from the literature and 
data in the four categories coded above, it was first noted that some categories shared 
many of the same properties.  The best way to view the relationships between the 
categories and properties was to construct a model, based on information from table12: 
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Table 12: Category Property Relationships  
 
 
 
 
                                    Category                                                   
Property
Outsourcing 
Theory
Socio-
Economic
Factors
Psychological 
Factors
Systemic 
Factors
IT Culture X X X X
Employment Conditions/Relationships X X X X
Economic Trends X X X X
Internationalization X X X
Opportunistic Behavior X X X
Ethical Flexibility X X X
Loyalty X X X
Social Trends X X X
Computer Dependency X X X
Technological Trends X X
Transaction Costs X X
Agency Costs X X
Information Distribution X X
Outsourcing Trends X X
Uncertainty X X
Contract Complexity/Length X  
Resource Gaps X
Measured Outcomes X
Resource Dependency X
Core Competencies X
Risk X
Disaster Recovery X
Organizational Culture X
Anti American Sentiment X
Personality Traits X
Interpersonal Social Frustrations X
Length of Employment X
Opportunity/Motive X
Emotional Needs/Power/Revenge X
Triggers X
Personnel Security Practice X
Access X
Management Practices X
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The first step in constructing the model was to identify the overarching properties 
of all four categories.  These are the antecedents or preconditions, shown in Figure 5, that 
guide the events or situations depicted by the interaction between model constructs. 
 
Figure 5: Preconditions for Outsourced IT and Insider Threat 
IT Culture, Employment Conditions and Relationships, and Economic Trends: 
Preconditions of the Model 
There are many factors driving the shifts in IT culture as it pertains to 
information.  The integration of information and its associated technology, tangible and 
intangible, into everyday life has not only changed the way business is done, but has had 
social effects.  Relationships are built, fostered, and sometimes destroyed over the 
Internet.  It has created many jobs, but cost some as well.  It has made work faster and 
more efficient in many organizations.  However, there are questions as to whether 
productivity has increased as a result of massive economic trends in IT investments.   
IT culture has brought with it in the last decade an ent irely new category of 
careers, literature, professional organizations, educational and degree programs, as well 
as its own vocabulary.  It has also brought with it its very own flavor of crime and rogue 
or deviant behavior.  Economic trends of Internet shopping, banking, financing, 
investing, and trading have opened opportunities for extraordinary numbers of identity 
 Antecedents to Outsourcing of IT and Insider Threat 
Information Technology Culture   
Employment Conditions/Relationships  
Economic Trends 
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theft cases.  Unstable relationships in organizations have resulted in vengeful hacking 
behavior, intrusions, malicious codes and sabotage, denial of service attacks, and 
intellectual property theft.   Interpersonal work conflicts are settled by wreaking havoc on 
core assets – information.  The federal government has stood up entire departments made 
up of professionals dedicated to securing our information and the equipment that 
manages it.   
These cultural and economic shifts can be viewed from both positive and negative 
angles.  However, they must be acknowledged as catalysts for larger economic, social, 
and even psychological issues that now confront establishments, directly and indirectly, 
on many levels. 
Model Constructs 
Figure 6 shows the category and property relationships that emerged from the data 
analysis. 
The categories of information are depicted in the model by the boxes with the  
bold outlines.  These are the major model constructs and each of their respected boxes 
lists properties not shared with other categories.   
The smaller boxes show the relationships between the categories and those 
properties shared by the connected categories.   
Model analysis will begin with the main categories, followed by exploration of 
the relationships between the categories as defined by the extracted properties. 
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Figure 6: Outsourced IT Insider Threat Model 
Unique Properties to the Four Major Categories 
Outsourcing Properties 
The properties descriptive of the outsourcing construct center around the 
conditions that are present while undergoing a process that involves considering, 
researching, writing, or recovering from a contracted effort. 
Resource Gaps 
In Chapter Two, resource gaps are mentioned as a primary reason to engage in 
contracting out.  Deficiencies in technological capabilities, assets, or skill sets are 
addressed under the Resource Based Theory (RBT) of outsourcing.  When a company 
 
Systemic Conditions 
Personnel Security Practices  
Access  
Management Practices 
Outsourcing Trends 
Information Distribution  
Uncertainty 
 
Socio-Economic Conditions 
Anti American Sentiment 
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requires these resources to maintain or gain a competitive edge, a viable option is to 
outsource.  Information technology and associated skills are outsourced to fill 
requirements an organization does not have the capability to staff in-house (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1994; Cheon et al., 1995; Tayntor, 2001). 
Measured Outcomes 
These are factors that require specific results from a contractor, such as producing 
a certain quantity or processing a minimum number of jobs.  Measured outcomes also 
require more stringent contract requirements and may drive up the cost of negotiating, 
writing, and monitoring the contract, in order to maintain control over the process (Cheon 
et al., 1995; Antonucci et al., 1998; Tayntor, 2001). 
Resource Dependency 
Referencing back to the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) in Chapter Two, 
RDT posits all organizations must depend on other organizations for something (Cheon et 
al., 1995).  Outsourcing is a strategy used to access technologies, services, or other 
resources not intrinsically available to the organization. 
Core Competencies 
Those items unique to an organization are not usually considered for outsourcing.  
Information technology is not often seen as a core competency; IT is a function viewed as 
imitable by other providers (Cheon et al., 1995).  However, in the case of the information 
that rides the IT systems, trade secrets or other proprietary information could possibly be 
viewed high-value information to the firm that gives it the competitive edge – if they are 
kept secret (Mata and Fuerst, 1995).  It is also true of National Security information and 
 
85 
the systems that can be considered “centers of gravity” to a network centric warfare 
environment.   
Risk 
As mentioned earlier, risk is inherent in the decision to outsource due to potential 
loss of control, IT security, and flexibility (Fink, 1994; Jurison, 1995; Antonucci et al., 
1998; Tayntor, 2001).   Resources must be allocated in such a way to avoid over-
investing “in certain measures to stem certain risks while paying inadequate attention to 
others” (Rumsfeld, 2002, p. 23).  Outsourced IT concerning the DoD could result in lack 
of security, flexibility, and control contributes to “Institutional Risk,” which Secretary 
Rumsfeld states is a result of “factors affecting the ability to develop management 
practices and controls that use resources efficiently and promote the effective operation 
of the Defense establishment” (2002, p. 23). 
Another kind of risk concerning outsourced IT is “Operational Risk.”  Kliem 
(1999) professes this type of risk stems from such behaviors as: “becoming too dependent 
on a vendor for mission critical services; being unable to determine the quality of the 
service being delivered; … having a vendor fail to provide an adequate level of services” 
(p. 3). These factors are directly related to the DoD’s ability to carry out mission 
objectives if a vendor is not performing as required.  Secretary Rumsfeld addresses the 
operational category of risk in the DoD’s risk management framework: “Operational risk 
stems from factors shaping the ability to achieve military objectives in a near-term 
conflict or other contingency” (2002, p. 23).  The risks of undermining the efficiency of 
military operations are present in the decision to outsource IT. 
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Disaster Recovery 
Risk and disaster recovery can be thought of in the same ilk of management 
concerns when pursuing outsourcing options.  According to Jurison (1995), “The 
dominant risk is the irreversibility of the decision” (p. 240).  Jurison also found that if an 
outsourced IT function does not work out, it could be “very costly and difficult to bring 
the work back into the firm” (p. 240).  Fink’s (1994) Security and Control Framework for 
Outsourced Information Systems (IS) contains a business recovery component that 
encompasses all other components of the model: 
 
Figure 7: Security and Control Framework for Outsourced IS (Fink, 1995) 
     Fink examines security risks in outsourcing and explains the need for an 
organization to “ensure continuity of business activities very carefully by identifying 
threats, devising counter-measures, and having procedures in place to overcome disasters 
 
Outsourced 
Information 
systems 
Performance 
management 
Application 
development
Organization and 
management 
Data entry 
A
ccess 
Output 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
Business recovery 
 
87 
should they occur” (p. 6).  The key to Fink’s model is that disaster recovery should be a 
first line consideration to all other factors in outsourcing information technology systems. 
Organizational Culture 
An organization with processes embedded in a complex social structure will find 
it naturally resistant to change, and according to Mata and Fuerst (1995) costly to change 
when it comes to outsourcing IT.  Mata and Fuerst’s resource-based analysis of  IT’s role 
in an organization’s competitive status “reflect the unique histories of individual firms, 
are often part of the “taken for granted” routines in an organization, and can be based on 
socially complex relations within the IT function, between the IT function and other 
business functions within a firm, and between the IT function and a firm’s suppliers or 
customers” (1995, p. 499). 
Because of the social complexities of organizations with strong cultures, effects of 
outsourcing on employee morale can be negative (Kliem, 1999) due to expected layoffs 
or displacement of IT talent to the vendor (Antonucci et al., 1998).  The social structure 
and behavior patterns of employees within the organization can be affected.  Employees 
may become concerned that management is concerned only for the organization and not 
the employees, possibly resulting in a less trusting environment.  Outsourcing IT is often 
“fraught with emotional arguments, difficult questions and complex links with many 
organizational processes” (Clark et al., 1995). 
Contract Complexity/Length 
Writing a more complex contract of course drives the cost.  However, in order to 
determine specific behaviors or performance standards desired by the contractor, it is 
sometimes necessary.  Recall that bounded rationality impacts the extent of contingency 
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planning, risk aversion, and disaster control that can be written into the contract.  The 
higher the uncertainty and risk aversion considerations in an outsourcing endeavor, the 
higher the contract agency costs will be.  The same applies to longer contracting 
relationships (Cheon et al., 1995). 
 
Psychological Properties 
Those properties found primarily in the Psychological Conditions construct 
pertain to individuals involved in the information technology environment.  These 
properties are presented as resulting from the proliferation of an interconnected computer 
environment, the outsourced IT environment, or a combination of both.  The significance 
of these properties is that they are potential indicators of who may be a security risk, and 
why. 
Personality Traits 
A blend of personality traits that were considered “direct implications for risk…” 
(Shaw et al., 1999, p. 2) all focused around an individual’s being more in tune with 
computers than people.  They are unable to successfully resolve issues in the work place, 
easily frustrated, and in spite of low self-esteem, and are narcissistic or view themselves 
as “special and owed corresponding recognition, privilege, or exception” (Shaw et al., 
1999, p. 4).  These characteristics are seen as risks due to a corresponding quickness to 
disappointment or anger, manifest their negative feelings in the form of computer-based 
actions such as e-mails, or even attacks. 
Shaw, Ruby, and Post also found “Every psychological assessment of 
programmers, computer scientists, computer science graduate students, and systems 
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administrators has found one common trait: introversion” (1999, p. 2). This trait carries 
with it the same implications of behavioral patterns previously discussed. 
Interpersonal Social Frustrations 
Along the lines of the personality trait of introversion, computer professionals 
have a tendency to replace human relationships with computers (Shaw et al., 1999).  
Social frustrations also manifest themselves in hatred for authority and vengeful 
behaviors.  Shaw, Ruby and Post’s research also found that a significant population who 
chose the computer science profession as a result of their inability to relate to other 
people (1998). 
Length of Employment 
Millward and Brewerton (1999) found that although it is feasible that contractors 
can be productive and loyal employees, there exists speculation that, “An emotionally-
detached and self- interested employee who fails to become integrated into the 
organizations is one whose commitments and energies are likely to be focused 
elsewhere” (p. 256).    
Short-term employees may not see their current employment situation as an 
opportunity for growth or professional (or personal) development, therefore, reducing 
level of commitment. Due to their transient nature “a lesser degree of loyalty to the firm 
or agency would be anticipated” (Shaw et al., 1998, p. 5) from short-term employees, 
such as contractors or subcontractors.  The longer an employee stays (or intends to stay) 
with an organization the more loyalty has a tendency to increase (Mueller and Wallace, 
1992). 
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Opportunity 
Opportunity for betrayal by an insider has increased with easier access to 
information in an interconnected environment; with that opportunity comes temptation 
(Heuer, 2001).  Not only is it easier to access data, it is easier to transmit it without 
detection.  Heuer also points out increased opportunity for foreign contacts due to 
industry trends: 
…where personnel involved in sensitive military R&D and production are 
increasingly in official business contact with their counterparts in foreign countries 
that are conducting espionage against the United States.  The line between military 
and non-military, and between classified technology and unclassified technology sold 
to foreign countries, is increasingly blurred (2001, p. 3). 
Motive 
Like opportunity, motive is also a precondition for negative insider behavior.   
Motivations can be intrinsic, such as emotional needs (discussed below) toward goals of 
increased self-esteem.  Motives can also be financial, or a combination of both (Heuer, 
2001), such as events in the work place resulting in “disgruntled employees who are 
angry about lay-offs, transfers, and other perceived grievances” (Shaw et al., 1998, p. 2).  
Non-malicious insider behavior can stem from curiosity, where the intruder was 
granted unnecessary access; Shaw, Ruby, and Post refer to curious people with no 
harmful intentions as “explorers” (1999).  Other types that explain motivation behind 
insider behavior include the individuals that feel they are gifted or special, similar to the 
character trait of narcissism mentioned earlier; this motivational type is termed 
“exception” (Shaw et al., 1999).  The Regan spy case is a prime example of someone 
who was financially motivated, but also believed he was entitled to more than he was 
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getting paid.  The result was his writing letters to the leaders of Iraq, Libya, and China, 
offering to sell classified satellite photos for $13M (McNulty, 2002).   
Emotional Needs, Power, and Revenge 
The Regan spy case can also be considered an example of revenge-seeking 
behavior against an agency, in this case, the intelligence community, for not meeting his 
needs, emotional, financial, or otherwise.  Disgruntled employees, whether current or 
presently on staff, are a “principal source of computer crimes” (FBI, 2000, p. 2).  There 
are many cases where an insider uses the power of system access and known 
vulnerabilities to “get back” at losing a contract or getting laid off.  Installing backdoors, 
Trojan horses, and logic bombs, as well as deleting files, are all very common methods of 
using the power of insider knowledge for revenge. 
Triggers 
Triggers are another of Heuer’s (2001) precondition for insider crimes besides 
opportunity and motive.  Compounded by personality traits discussed previously, triggers 
are simply the event that causes an employee to cross the line into undesired insider 
behavior.  It is posited that individuals displaying the character disorders or personality 
traits discussed above may have more of a tendency toward betrayal that can be 
“triggered by some event in the individual’s personal or professional life that pushes 
stress beyond that person’s breaking point” (Heuer, 2001, p. 4). 
Finally, besides opportunity, motive and triggers, Heuer considers reduced 
inhibitions such as ethical flexibility and unstable loyalty (to be discussed later) to 
complete the list of preconditions for insider crime.  He also states, “The prevalence of 
these four conditions is influenced by changes in social and economic conditions in the 
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United States and in our relations with the rest of the world” (2001, p. 4).  This statement 
leads to the next section that discusses the Socio-Economic properties related to these 
preconditions, traits, and characteristics. 
 
Socio-Economic Properties 
The primary property unique only to the Socio-Economic category is that of Anti-
American Sentiment.  As the previous section indicated, U.S. relations with the rest of the 
world will have some bearing over the social interactions, trends, and psyches of people 
who create, process, transmit, and dispose of information and its associated technologies. 
Anti-American Sentiment 
Anti-American Sentiment is not restricted to those outside the United States.  Due 
to the modern geographically immune nature of information, the business community is 
more prolific than ever in a global setting.  As a result of “internationalization of many 
high technology fields, combined with the increased number and variety of countries 
conducting intelligence operations against the United States” (Heuer, 2001, p. 3), 
combined with increased joint IT ventures with overseas companies, especially in third 
world countries (Keeler, 1997), the U.S. may have opened its cyber borders beyond 
control.  
Outside our borders, however, there is a definitive trend in how the world 
community views the U.S.  A recent survey by Pew Research Center entitled, What the 
World Thinks in 2002, showed that “since 2000, favorability ratings for the U.S. have 
fallen in 19 of the 27 countries where trend benchmarks are available” (Pew, 2002, p. 1). 
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According the 2002 Pew report, science and technological advances are admired 
by world majorities (with the exception of Russia); however, there is an overwhelming 
rejection of “the wide diffusion of American ideas and customs” (p. 63).  Americans 
continue to believe the rest of the world welcomes our cultural influences, and that we are 
benefactors to the world.  The global opinion is not conducive to “the spread of American 
influence and often say the U.S. creates more problems than it solves” (p. 70). 
This concept is crucial to understanding that Americans less accepting of foreign 
culture have obstacles to overcome in a global market where our values are being seen as 
forced on others.  This concept of Anti-American sentiment is an important consideration 
in the information technology environment where loyalty, whether it be American or 
another nation’s, can impact the threat potential. 
 
Systemic Properties 
Personnel Security Practices 
This was covered extensively in the literature review in Chapter Two.  However, 
it is a critical factor in controlling who is accessing critical information systems.  This is 
especially important when considering outsourcing IT systems, given the potential threat 
posed by those armed with critical system knowledge.  It is important to know who is 
using, managing, operating, and maintaining IT.   
According to a 2002 NASA IG report: 
 
Our audit, Approvals for Accessing Information Technology Systems (IG-02-004), 
found that two NASA installations did not complete required security investigations 
for all personnel who accessed sensitive IT systems. In our test sample, we found that 
one Center completed security investigations for less than 20 percent of contractor 
 
94 
employees who were accessing sensitive IT systems. At the other Center, we found 
that temporary employees with access to sensitive IT systems did not receive required 
security investigations.  (NASA, 2002, p. 5) 
Not only do employees, including contractor personnel, require screening, levels 
of access concurrent with personnel duties should also be determined and enforced. 
Access 
The protection of information was once protected by physical means, such as 
safes and locked doors.  It is more difficult to control access to data that rides on public 
infrastructure, or that is accessed by more people due to outsourcing.   
Modern day protection “focuses on protecting information systems and data from 
accidental or intentional unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, or destruction” 
(Loch, 1992, p. 173).  Public key infrastructure, for example, is a modern method of 
controlling access that only allows certain actions to be performed by a key holder. 
Management Practices 
While securing the facilities, screening personnel, and controlling access are all 
part of keeping information secure, management must also implement prescribed security 
procedures, enforce controls, and efficiently deal with breaches. 
Firing people also has its security concerns.  Individuals who know they are 
targets for outsourced or downsized functions are sometimes apt to sabotage data or 
delete records, install logic bombs, or trap doors in the systems they can access from 
outside the company.  Management must ensure when engaging in drastic personnel and 
organizational changes, that passwords and access privileges are reviewed for all 
concerned.  Referencing back to the section on disaster recovery, management should be 
prepared for any attacks by disgruntled or former employees. 
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Relationships Between Categories 
There were properties shared between three categories, two categories, and some 
properties unique to one category (covered by the previous section).   This section 
describes the interactive relationships that occur between properties.   
Psychological, Socio-Economic, and Systemic Conditions 
The most collective grouping of properties shared by the psychological, socio-
economic, and systemic categories, shown in Figure 8: 
  
  
Figure 8: Common Properties of Psychological, Socio-Economic, and Systemic Categories 
Internationalization 
This is a term referencing the global economy and business market activity.  
People from many countries, cultures, and beliefs are connected through technological 
advances that bring economic and social issues into focus in a media rich environment.  
Technology trends have given organizations the ability to conference globally and 
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coordinate business transactions and plans online.  International relationships are 
becoming the norm, organizationally and socially. 
Another aspect of internationalization involves the influence foreign-born persons 
have had on our education and employment systems.  As mentioned earlier in the 
literature a large portion of graduate degrees awarded in the United States are to students 
from other nations (Heuer, 2001).  Furthermore, highly technical fields have seen an 
influx of international workers through the H1B visa and other programs.   
Internationalization is making it harder to draw clear borders between countries in 
the interconnected global environment.  U.S. businesses have established offices globally, 
and other countries have brought the ir companies to the U.S.  It is also with this trend of 
internationalization that conflicting loyalties between countries may become an issue 
(Heuer, 2001). 
Ethical Flexibility 
The relationship between the Psychological, Socio-Economic, and Systemic 
categories also includes the property of ethical flexibility.  As a result of a computer 
dependent society, it is possible that it is becoming more difficult for many people to 
realize the overall impact of their keyboard strokes or mouse clicks.  Work by Shaw, 
Ruby, and Post mentions this type of ethical flexibility with respect to the computer work 
environment as well as cross-generational lack of training and guidance in schools and at 
home by parents (1998).   
High-tech workers have expressed concern that job security is at risk, fearing 
displacement due to influxes of H-1B visa workers (capped at 195,000 per year); H-1B 
visa workers are often reported to be paid one-third less than American workers.  “With 
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layoffs rising, paranoia and distrust set in, not only between Americans and foreigners, 
but between different workers, too” (Swartz, 2001, p. 4).  This type of environment has 
resulted in disgruntled American workers who harass, threaten, and demoralize foreign 
workers (Swartz, 2001), sacrificing and ethics in the work place for fear of being laid off. 
Loyalty 
Employee loyalty has been examined in this research not only from the individual 
psychological perspective and the IT personality profiling but also from the perspective 
of contracted employment.  Cond itions in the social and organizational environments in 
the workplace can determine loyalty an employee may have for his employer.  The 
effects of short-term employment contracts can logically have an effect on loyalty when 
an individual is not integrally identified with the organization (Millward and Brewerton, 
1999).  One can look at the Socio-Economic situations common in the news about Enron 
and other companies costing employees their retirement to hypothesize whether 
employee loyalty has been shaken on a larger scale.   
Social Trends 
Social trends, not only in the international environment, but amongst computer 
users and professionals, have had a certain impact on the psyches and relationships in the 
high tech work environments.  Social situations in other countries have driven Indians 
and Chinese (among others) to the United States to pursue education and employment 
under the H1B visa program.  However, in a post “September 11th” environment 
especially, H1B visa holders have become the victims of “threatening notes, demanding 
that Indian workers ‘go home’” (Swartz, 2001).  It is becoming more commonplace for 
tensions between American and foreign workers to rise as studies by major universities 
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such as University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and Cornell found H1B visa 
workers were being hired at 20 to 33 percent lower wages than Americans in the same 
fields. 
Other social trends among computer users include the constant upgrading that is 
done to keep up with technological trends.  Studies regarding the “productivity paradox” 
are being devoted to determining whether the investments in computer technology are 
really paying off in terms of productivity.  Personal computer trends have also brought 
with it a computer-savvy and sometimes dependent generation as well. 
Computer Dependency 
While entire societies, in the United States and globally, have become dependent 
on the information that can be rapidly accessed by even more rapidly advancing 
technology, people have become dependent on computers in a psycho logical regard as 
well as cultural.  Studies focusing on insiders and IT have shown computer dependency 
as a personality trait common among deviant insiders.  Furthermore, these computer 
dependent persons turn to computers to fill social needs not being me t by relationships 
with other people, whether informally or at work or school (Shaw et al., 1998). 
 
Outsourcing, Psychological, and Socio-Economic Conditions 
This section describes briefly the one property shared by the Outsourcing, 
Psychological, and Socio-Economic categories, shown in Figure 9: 
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Figure 9: Opportunistic Behavior 
 
Opportunistic Behavior 
This property is considered to be a tenet of Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
approaches to outsourcing, in terms of human behavior.   The risk inherent to outsourcing 
due to our bounded rationality and the “assumption that agents, acting in their own self-
interest, are subject to opportunistic behaviour” (Jurison, 1995, p. 241) is most certainly 
human-based.  It is this property, driven possibly by employment or Socio-Economic 
conditions that ties the psychology of the computer-dependent, ethically flexible, and 
possibly vengeful or narcissistic to the outsourcing risk.  It is a substantial connection 
when looking at insider behavior, especially that of the new generation of IT personalities 
that have become characteristic of the IT professional and the social conditions of the 
work environment where outsourcing IT is taking place. 
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Outsourcing and Psychological Conditions 
The main properties shared by these two categories involve transaction and 
agency costs.  This relationship is shown in the Figure 10: 
 
 
Figure 10: Transaction and Agency Costs 
Transactional costs are the costs for those goods and services provided by a 
vendor (including market research and writing of contracts).  This relationship, often 
short term, may generate a less relationship-based commitment from contractors as 
Millward and Brewerton examine in their 1999 study.  They go on to warn against 
putting all contractors in the same category as being disconnected from the workplace.  
Contracted employees are to be considered as people, and not just assets or resources.  
Millward and Brewerton also found in their study that “it is possible for ‘contractors’ to 
be integrated within the workplace on a partnership basis so long as outsourcing 
arrangements are strategically initiated and managed” (1999, p. 272).   
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It is the psychology of the IT professional that makes outsourcing IT unique to 
most other functions.  In building that relationship, and attempting to obtain a contract 
that specifies the desired outcomes and behaviors, the agency costs that are accumulated 
in the negotiating, litigating, and monitoring of the contract, can increase as the contract 
becomes more complex. In order to keep certain personality traits of high tech workers 
(narcissism, or vengeful actions upon contract completion or discontinuance) from 
manifesting into dangerous insider behavior, contracts must address contingency 
responses to disasters and security controls, both on the part of the vendor, and on the 
organization outsourcing its IT. 
 
Outsourcing and Socio-Economic Conditions 
The connection between these two categories is more conspicuous.  Figure 11 
shows the relationship and the common property of technological trends to the 
Outsourcing and Socio-Economic Conditions categories: 
 
Figure 11: Technological Trends  
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Technological Trends 
Rapid development of technology is an obvious driver in outsourcing.  Operating, 
training, and maintenance costs to keep up with IT trends have given organizations 
economic and strategic reasons to leave IT to the people who specialize in computer-
based technology.  Increasing demands on information capabilities of  those 
organizations depending on IT have made IT “one of the most outsourced services” often 
due to “…shortage of skilled IT staff within most organizations, an inability to cover a 
rapidly expanding field adequately and the lack of flexibility which can result from over-
investment in a particular technology” (Domberger et al., 2000, p. 107).     
IT trends have made information a global commodity, fostering socio-economic 
effects of overseas employment, local downsizing, and outsourcing (Heuer, 2001).  Other 
socio-economic outgrowths of IT trends include: the aforementioned H1B visa program 
that allows 115,000 people a year from other countries to apply for highly skilled 
positions in the United States (Swartz, 2001); and growing trends in offshore cont racts 
with software and hardware companies (Keeler, 1997). 
 
Socio-Economic and Systemic Conditions 
With trends in technology advancements come trends in outsourcing behavior, as 
well as trends in widespread distribution of information.  Figure 12 depicts these 
properties and their shared relationship with the Socio-Economic and Systemic 
categories: 
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Figure 12: Outsourcing Trends and Information Distribution 
Outsourcing trends 
Rapid development of technology and capabilities from an organizational 
standpoint can undoubtedly give rise to the need to fill information resource gaps from 
outside organizations.  Information technology and management of information is often 
seen as a service than can be easily outsourced in order to reduce costs of training and 
maintaining to keep up with rapid advancement.  If information management is not a core 
competency or the function that sets an organization apart from its competitors, it is often 
the case that there are people specializing in IT services who can remove that high tech 
burden from management.  While risk is inherent, there have been many cases where 
outsourcing IT has proven to be the economically and strategically best option to keep 
abreast of technological trends (Antonucci et al., 1998; Grover and Ramanlal, 1999; and 
Tayntor, 2001).   
Within the federal government, IT service contracts alone “have increased from 
$3.7 billion in fiscal year 1990 to about $13.4 billion in FY 2000” (GAO, 2002, p. 6). 
Information Distribution  
While information distribution has provided a lubricant of sorts to a society that 
wants (and expects) information at its fingertips, recent focuses in the federal government 
of the United States have encouraged reconsideration of accessible information. Recent 
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articles outlining efforts by the DoD to “strip military Web site of information that could 
benefit adversaries” (Poulson, 2003).   According to PERSEREC’s Richards Heuer: 
The equivalent of safe-loads of material can be copied in a matter of minutes and 
transmitted electronically around the globe, often without detection, almost 
instantaneously…Now, classified and sensitive but unclassified technical information 
are both stored in large, electronic databases that can often be accessed by large 
numbers of people with little or no regard for need-to-know. (1999, p. 7) 
The perspective that information is becoming harder to control due to 
technological trends (Heuer, 2001) and trends toward information sharing (Shaw et al., 
1998) is also a reality.  Peter Drucker, in his book Post Capitalist Society, describes 
information as boundless on a geographic basis, “knowing no country” (1994, p. 143) and 
that once the information is out, it is impossible to regain control of it. 
Drucker also points out that countries all over the world are finding high tech 
ways to access programming (radio, television, or movie), sometimes forbidden by their 
governments.  Other societies base their opinions on Americans, their values, and 
lifestyle on the limited programs they can access even if it presents a “distorted”  
presentation of American culture (1994).   
 
Outsourcing and Systemic Conditions 
The property shared by primarily by the Outsourcing and Systemic categories 
addresses aspects of the work situation where workers are not secure in their futures or 
roles in the organization. 
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Figure 13: Uncertainty 
Uncertainty 
This property can be injected into a work environment when employees are not 
sure if their future with an organization is secure.  This is especially true with more 
frequent downsizing and outsourcing trends in the IT environment, which “often results 
in layoffs or the transfer of existing employees to the IT vendor.  Such displacement can 
set morale into a tailspin and cause even talented staff to fear for their employment 
security” (Antonucci et al., 1998, p. 28).  Uncertainty can often be injected in the work 
environment through outsourcing arrangements that leave management and employees 
feeling loss of control and flexibility of their IT programs and people (Kliem, 1999; 
Lacity, 2001; and Tayntor, 2001), and lower quality of service (Antonucci et al., 1998) in 
the desired responsiveness and efficiency required of their IT programs.   
Jurison makes the connection of uncertainty to risk in the decision to outsource 
IT, as management can never entirely predict all of the outcomes and that “humans are 
unable to foresee the complexities and contingencies in contractual relationships and 
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consequently can only achieve incomplete contracts” (1995, p. 241).  However, stringent 
inspector general (IG) programs are one effective effort to reducing the uncertainty 
induced by subcontracting.  The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
IG reported a subcontractor was found and pled guilty to providing false statements 
documenting the production of faulty parts for the International Space Station and a DoD 
unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.  The parts “contained unauthorized weld repairs.  
These repairs were not disclosed to NASA or the DoD” (NASA, 2001, p. 48). 
In the IT community, some unfortunate results have shown up in subcontracting 
practices, which have been known to occur without management’s knowledge and “cause 
problems, including viruses brought in by subcontractors, poor communications, high 
costs and low-quality service” (Antonucci et al., 1998, p. 26).  By examining an actual 
case of insider threat, the next section will explore the complete model and the theory 
developed. 
Model Focus  
The theory generated by the concepts and relationships the model that construes 
the complex phenomenon of the insider threat, the core focus of this research.  Figure 14 
shows the final model as emergent from the categories and properties.    
This model presents not only a theory on insider threat dynamics but presents a 
case for future monitoring of outsourced IT situations.  Indicators to where potential 
vulnerabilities lie, point to toward workplace controls in security, personnel (contractor 
and subcontractor) screening, and enforcing of access controls. 
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Figure 14: IT Outsourcing and Insider Threat Model 
Summary 
The final model proposed here shows all four originating categories related to 
insider threat to outsourced information technology.  The properties that have emerged 
from the data, literature, testimony, proceedings, and cases studied show relationships 
between the categories, giving the model its conceptual density.  The scope of this 
research only allowed for limited study of outsourcing IT and its impact on the insider 
threat phenomenon.   
Conceptual density of this model can be further achieved, however, by continuing 
to cross-connect the concepts of this model to gain more insight into the insider threat for 
predictive purposes.  For example, there may be denser cross-connections between the 
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properties of risk, uncertainty, and information distribution to the Psychological category 
that could be explored.  From this more categories and properties may emerge, giving a 
better psychological profiling tool for detecting ins ider behavior as a result of 
organizational risk-taking.  The grounded theory methodology insists continuous cross-
connecting of ideas until the model is essentially saturated to achieve pure conceptual 
density.  This is beyond the scope of this research, but may be helpful in future 
endeavors. 
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V. Case Study and Model Comparison 
Zhangyi Liu Case  
This case refers to the incident where Zhangyi “Steven” Liu, a subcontractor, 
gained unauthorized access to a critical government information system.  By 
reintroducing the model and overlaying the concepts evident in this case, this study 
demonstrates a high profile situation and the complexity of the insider threat to 
outsourced information technology within the DoD.  The information on the case came 
primarily from a series of articles published in a local paper, the Dayton Daily News. 
Liu Case Background 
In 1996, a system administrator at Wright Patterson AFB discovered a security 
breach in the operations side of the Reliability and Maintainability Information System 
(REMIS) (Gaffney, 1997).  REMIS is a $148M logistics system used for tracking aircraft 
and weapons systems mission capability data, such as maintenance information, missile 
and communications-electronic information, and aircraft inventory data.  Although it is 
an unclassified system, REMIS “does contain highly sensitive information, both 
militarily and economically” (Hills and Gaffney, 1997b, p. 1A). 
The security breach was by a subcontracted computer programmer, Zhangyi Liu, 
who was working on developmental software improvements for REMIS. Liu accessed a 
“super super password” file that contained over 400 REMIS user passwords (Hills, 
1999a).  He and two other co-workers proceeded to download unauthorized files to a 
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personal directory that could have potentially been accessed by Internet users, according 
to an FBI source (Hills and Gaffney, 1997b). 
 
Outsourced Sources 
  The prime contractor, Litton Industries Incorporated, subcontracted REMIS 
developmental software work to Muscato Corporation in Florida.  Muscato Corp. then 
subcontracted again to Shanghai Tandem Software Systems, Limited in Shanghai, China.  
Eleven Chinese citizens from Shanghai Tandem were sent to the Dayton, Ohio Litton 
office to perform software improvements to REMIS system programs (Hills and Gaffney, 
1997b, p. 1A). 
Uncertainty of  Subcontractor 
This second-tier outsourcing practice increased uncertainty and diluted security 
safeguards for the critical information being maintained on REMIS. The Material 
Systems Group (MSG) found that due to “Privity of Contract Rights” the government 
was not allowed to access subcontract information of fixed price contracts.  Since then, 
according to a former MSG executive director, contracts must now require that the use of 
foreign nationals be disclosed (Hills and Gaffney, 1997b). 
Core Competencies and Information Superiority 
One of the Air Force core competencies in Air Force Doctrine Document  
(AFDD) 1 states “the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while 
denying an adversary to do the same and, like air and space superiority, includes gaining 
control over the information realm and fully exploiting military information functions” 
(1997, p. 31).   
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Liu’s possession of the password file, with access to super- level accounts “gave 
him the power to create, change, or delete any file in the system” (Hills, 1999b, p. 1A).  
Quoting OSI agent Matthews, “Wood [the system administrator who discovered the 
breach] was stunned to find the password file, not only to the users of the development 
system, but also super super accounts and passwords to the operational side of REMIS as 
well” (Gaffney, 1997, p. 19A).  The subcontractors were not authorized top- level access 
to the development system or any access to the operational system.  However, “Liu had 
gotten both and now he had every top- level password for REMIS at his disposal” 
(Gaffney, 1997, p. 19A). 
When Liu’s access was discovered, there was an immediate concern that the 
contract personnel working on the system, who were Chinese nationals, may have indeed 
exploited a critical database that tracks aircraft weapons systems data.  This was a 
potential compromising of the integrity of the system and hampering the Air Force’s 
strive toward not only information superiority, but also another core competency – air 
and space superiority.  Air and space superiority “is that degree of dominance that 
permits friendly land, sea, and air forces to operate at a given time and place without 
prohibitive interference by the opposing force” (AFDD-1, 1997, p. 29).   
Risk, Disaster Recovery, and Costs 
Outsourcing decisions concerning IT systems entail the risk of the possibility of a 
disaster, rendering a system or an organization helpless.  In the case of Liu’s intrusion, 
the incident cost the prime contractor, Litton, and the Air Force over $358K to examine 
code and data to ensure no back doors or malicious code had been installed by Liu or his 
coworkers.  Another $15K was spent to install the missing security patches that allowed 
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Liu to access the operational side of the system in the first place.  This patch was not 
installed previously due to “funding considerations”, according to an Air Force official’s 
reported concession at the hearing (Hills, 1997).  Finally, there are no estimates for 
contract reviews Air Force wide and “costs of investigations by the FBI and the Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations” (Hills, 2000b, p. 3B). 
REMIS Contract with Litton 
The contract for the REMIS system was held by Litton, PRC for 11 years, at a 
cost to the Air Force of $150M (Modic, 1999a).  An Air Force official testified at Liu’s 
hearing “he was unaware that Liu and 10 other Chinese nationals were brought in by a 
subcontractor to debug and improve REMIS’ developmental side” (Hills, 1997, p. 1A).  
Liu’s attorneys also stated that the access procedures were never laid out as they were 
hired to “service the system without ever telling them what they couldn’t do” (Hills, 
1999a, p. 1B). 
Cheap Labor - Opportunistic Behavior 
While it is unknown whether Liu was working in the U.S. under the H1B visa 
program, it is known that he was working for only $500 per month (Hills, 1999a).  There 
is continuing controversy over the hiring of H1B foreign workers by IT companies 
because they are reputed to work for less money.  By cutting labor costs, contractors and 
subcontractors are able to potentially maximize their profits. 
Psychological Background 
Not much is known about the personality or behavior characteristics of Liu.  His 
computer programming background, however, may give psychologists a starting point for 
analyzing personality traits to see if Liu matches the theorized profile of the IT 
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professional (introverted, narcissistic, computer dependent, etc.)  His ethical flexibility, 
however, did come out during the trial and was self-admitted.   
Insight to his motives, however, was revealed by attorneys and investigators 
involved in the case.  What is known about Liu was that he was a bright, successful 
student who got through college on scholarships.  His degree is in electronic engineering 
from Shanghai Jiao Tong University, where he graduated in 1994.  He was “in the top 10 
percent of excellent students at the university, according to court records” (Hills, 1999a, 
p. 1B). 
Curiosity as Motive 
An initial theory was said to be Liu’s curiosity.  Being from a poor background, 
he sent most of his paycheck home to his parents.  He told the judge during his trial that 
he was curious about his performance evaluation because he just wanted to do well in this 
country.  In his search for documented information about his performance, he 
accidentally found the password file, which was not encrypted with the prescribed patch 
(Hills, 1999a.). 
Emotional Needs and ‘The Brass Ring’ 
Power and perhaps self-esteem needs could have encouraged Liu’s behavior once 
found the password file.  Public defender Paul Hensley claimed that Liu’s motivation was 
to “simply ‘capture the brass ring’ or simply show off to his fellow programmers” (Hills, 
1999b, p. 1A).  Liu was said to have wanted to impress a female coworker with his access 
to her password, and reportedly told an investigative agent, “he wanted to own the 
system” (Hills, 1997, p. 1A).  A computer expert testifying as a defense witness at Liu’s 
trial explained the programmer mentality of ‘capture the flag’, where gaining access to 
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password files “was a badge of achievement among programmers” (Modic, 1999b, p. 
1B). 
Ethical Flexibility in an Unsecured System 
In addition to the aforementioned stereotypical programmer mentality of 
‘capturing the flag’, one could attribute Liu’s neglecting to report the vulnerability to the 
system administrator to an ethical flexibility trend in computer culture.  Liu did mention 
to one of his attorneys that he was considering trying to access “internal e-mail which 
might have as its subject an evaluation of his performance” (Hills and Gaffney, 1997a, p. 
1A).  Liu also admitted that, “he was allowed to walk in a room of secrets.  They put the 
tools in the room without ever telling me not to use them, and just expecting that I 
wouldn’t” (Hills, 1999a, p. 1B).   
Liu and five of his Chinese coworkers “flunked lie-detector tests in which they 
asked if they had provided the passwords to anyone, downloaded the password files to 
steal them for personal gain, or used the passwords files to gain access to other computer 
systems” (Hills, 1999a, p. 1B).  He also admitted in court that he knew that people from 
his country “should not have been allowed to work on the system: security was so lax, he 
concluded ‘was not a concern here’” (Hills, 1999a, p. 1B). 
 
Socio-Economic Factors 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, trends in the national and global environments 
impact the outsourcing market and its subsequent injections into an organization’s 
boundaries.  One of those trends prevalent in today’s information technology defined 
culture is internationalization of IT jobs, within the United States and overseas. 
 
115 
Outsourcing Trends - International IT 
Zhangyi Liu was one of 11 computer experts of Chinese nationality brought from 
Shanghai Tandem Software Systems, Ltd. from Shanghai, China in 1996.  Offshore 
software development has been a building trend since the early 1990’s, primarily due to 
cost (Mohan, 2001).  The H1B visa program was part of this initiative to bring new talent 
into the IT development scene, as American workers were becoming reportedly scarce.  
This can be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as a way of “leveraging the 
creative talents of skilled workers around the globe” (Mohan, 2001, p. 103).   
However, this may increase the insider threat if employees are from countries 
known to be conducting espionage activities against the United States.  In Liu’s case, 
China is a known intelligence threat to the U.S., and Liu was in a position to devastate a 
database critical to combat readiness status of the entire Air Force aircraft inventory.  
Information Distribution 
With geographical boundaries disintegrating into the IT global culture, 
unauthorized access within the bounds of the system can be easily exploited over the 
Internet to anyone outside the system.  Liu’s unauthorized access made sensitive file 
information completely visible over the Internet, which could have easily been exploited 
by China or any other foreign power (Hills and Gaffney, 1997b).  Liu’s case 
demonstrates a double-edged insider threat: the prolific distribution of information has 
the power to enable one trusted insider to unlock virtual doors (by installing backdoors, 
for example) for many outsiders. 
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Anti-American Sentiment 
It was never released whether Liu had succeeded in making REMIS information 
available to Chinese adversaries, and two of Liu’s Chinese coworkers have since returned 
to China.  However, China’s spying on the U.S. was at the forefront of the intelligence 
community during the Liu investigation, due to the investigation of Wen Ho Lee and his 
alleged theft of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos Laboratories. While no visible anti-
Americanism was evident in Liu’s case, it is becoming increasingly important to realize 
the unfortunate but critical threat potential from the international community. 
During the presently on-going Global War on Terror, the FBI has communicated 
a serious threat from foreign intelligence services “who are dedicated to using any means 
necessary to obtain strategic information from the United States” (FBI, 2003, p. 9).   
 
The Final Systemic Frontier – Security and Access Control 
The IT Outsourcing and Insider Threat model depicts a logical relationship how 
factors and conditions outside an organization’s boundaries inevitably impact the 
systemic conditions.  While the physical layout of model constructs was intended to show 
merely interrelationships, it was surprising how the image of the model gives the 
impression of an arrow – pointing toward the Systemic Condition construct.  This is 
where the insider works.  The manager responsible for the information system, its people, 
security policies, practices, and access controls has a lot of issues and challenges in trying 
to control his information domain within seemingly diminishing borders. 
Liu’s case shows the need for access controls is detrimentally clear.  The REMIS 
system was not secured with the intended security program that was designed to encrypt 
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user accounts and passwords (Hills and Gaffney, 1997).  Furthermore, Liu was allegedly 
never given clear-cut security guidelines for what he could or could not do on the system.  
Finally, foreign nationals working on government IT systems has got to set off alarms 
with management in terms of threat potential, especially in an age increasing Anti-
Americanism globally.  
 
Implications 
Liu was hired by XYPRO Technology Corporation in Simi Vally, California, the 
designer of the security system that was supposed to be installed on the REMIS system.  
Liu, however, “is no longer allowed to perform services for the [U.S.] government” 
(Hills, 1998, p. 2B).  However, with increasing outsourcing trends in IT, how will the 
government know if he performs subcontractor services in the future?  The need to 
aggressively track insider cases and monitor contractor behavior has been identified and 
made more urgent by the following statement during Robert Mueller, III’s testimony 
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on War on Terrorism: 
The government currently supports research and development in a large number of 
agencies, in a great many locations, many of which involve the use of thousands of 
government contractors.  The FBI has the responsibility to assess the threat against 
those projects and to initiate operations that are directed at countering the threat.  US 
Government entities, primarily the Departments of Energy and Defense, constitute the 
primary focus of the FBI’s activity in this area.  The individuals awarded research and 
development contracts in support of ongoing operations and war-making capabilities 
constitute the highest risk. (FBI, 2003, p. 9) 
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Summary 
The Liu case is just one that implies the multi-dimensional threat from the inside 
is not a computer problem.  It is truly a people problem.  The model in Chapter Four 
demonstrates the dire complexities involved in outsourcing information technology that 
ultimately enables more outsiders to become insiders.  The challenge for IT managers is 
tremendous, and it comes down to one thing – securing information from exploitation by 
the ill-meaning insider.   
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VI.   Conclusion 
Introduction 
The insider threat is inherent in society’s strive toward finding better, faster, 
cheaper, and simpler ways to pass information, accomplish business objectives, and 
survive in a fast-paced instant and impatient society.  The risks have been created along 
with the technology, perhaps without fully realizing their devastating potential; or maybe 
we have just accepted the risks as part of technological advancement. 
Regardless, it is clear that the insider threats and other security challenges were 
not created by the actual computers and technology, but by the people who have access, 
authorized or not, to the systems. 
Findings 
The most profound discovery of this research is the impact technology has had 
not only on how we do business, but how it has imposed social and psychological and 
even cultural metamorphoses on the last generation, if not last several generations.  While 
evolutionary shifts in economies, markets, and even some aspects of cultures are natural, 
the last few decades have brought about permutations in society and our psyches for 
which rapid innovations may not have prepared us.   
This research generated a comprehensive model that, through integration of 
concepts put forth in related literature and studies, presents a multidimensional view of 
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the scope of conditions from which the insider threat has emerged.  It is a real, growing, 
and considerably urgent threat to information systems. 
The emphasis on the model is the discursive nature of the insider threat in the 
outsourced IT environment.  This threat cannot be confined to a static formula to 
calculate generic risk.  It is operative and persevering, and needs to be dynamically 
measured, investigated, and reevaluated as social, economic, cultural, and techno logical 
trends shift.  By following a contingency theory approach toward making this model 
modifiable to different situations where outsourcing is being considered, it may be 
possible to reduce or nearly eliminate some sources of threat when conscientiously 
applied.   
However, the main focus of the theories and model generated by this research was 
to alter the decisional paradigm surrounding the outsourcing of IT and the threats that are 
possible.  This model combines varied fields of study to assist decision-makers in 
transcending the bounded rationality that is human nature.  While it is impossible to 
predict every source, method, motive, and timing of attacks, this model will aid in the 
protection of information systems from a wider range of scenarios, evident in recent 
insider attack events. 
Implications  
The thrust of this research was to not only raise awareness to the insider threat 
problem as it relates to outsourcing of information technology-based systems, but to 
encourage development of more comprehensive operational and personnel security 
programs focused on access to information.  Where national security is concerned, there 
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should be more focus on the potential threats from internal sources, especially as 
outsourcing continues to increase as a way of doing business.   
Today’s outsourcing trend in military IT must build in better screening 
procedures.  Tracking of personnel having access to critical systems “as perpetrators 
migrate from job to job, protected by the lack of background checks, constraints upon 
employers in providing references, and the lack of significant consequences for these 
offenses” (Shaw et al., 1998, p. 2) is crucial. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The limitations of this research (lack of statistical data and metrics) offer 
significant opportunities for further research.  While this is a new research area with no 
formal theory, additional research on the model presented in this thesis will allow for 
greater conceptual density. 
This model gives a broad framework from which to analyze existing cases to 
determine the presence of conditions under which the insider is able to successfully carry 
out deviant actions.  These actions could range from disregarding basic stated security 
policies (loyalty, ethical flexibility, personnel security practices, access, personality traits, 
uncertainty about future employment, length of employment, or triggers) to espionage 
activity (internationalization, interpersonal social frustrations, transactional behavior, 
access, outsourcing trends, opportunistic behavior, and ethical flexibility). 
This model is presented for further research into the perceived rise in insider 
threat trends, and whether outsourcing of information technology is a major contributor 
to this problem.  It was demonstrated tha t information technology is indeed not just a 
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service or administrative function to be contracted out to the lowest bidder.  Current 
events give chilling examples daily of insiders endangering the security and lives of 
innocent people, and in order to protect them, it is vital to protect the information that is 
critical to national interests. 
This model gives justification for further investigation of contracted (and 
subcontracted) information technology, especially in the Department of Defense.  The 
clearance procedures of those entrusted to provide their valued services, the verification 
of the identities of all who access our information, and tracking of negative contractor 
(and others’) behaviors should be a primary security consideration. 
To reiterate concerns of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team, “The 
Department [of Defense] has no unified database of insider case studies, lessons learned, 
physiological profiles or statistics regarding the insider and insider misuse, abuse, or 
malicious activity” (2000, p. A-2).  Such a database urgently needs to built and utilized to 
obtain metrics on such activity. 
A recommendation for further inductive research efforts to complete the 
theoretical density of this proposed model is to examine the social theories of 
outsourcing, such as social exchange, social contract, and power political theories.  These 
theories will give even more social and psychological insight into outsourcing behaviors 
and conditions. 
A final recommendation is to add a legal perspective to this model.  A study of 
U.S. Codes, laws, and DoD Directives, and Federal Acquisition Regulations pertaining to 
information technology and security would be beneficial to determine whether legal 
protections or shortfalls are contributors to the insider threat to outsourced IT.  
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Recommendations to policy makers, based on potential relevant findings, could have 
national security implications in the future.  
Conclusion 
In reflecting back to this time 12 years ago, another George Bush was president, 
and we were building up forces for a pending conflict with Iraq.  We were doing it 
without the extensive use of e-mail and the Internet, and with a military force twice as 
large and a force to be reckoned with (which is still the case) worldwide.  Today, in the 
information age that was supposed to bring the world together through a global market, 
the United States has not only been attacked, but has been alerted to a clear and present 
danger of more devastating attacks - within the very borders we’ve opened to the world.   
In trying to maintain proficiency in the rapidly changing information technology 
age, we’ve found it necessary to seek sources outside our organizational borders to keep 
up with societal and economic trends.  In doing this, we’ve also opened our information 
to increased risks, not just from the outside, but from those we have trusted to manage the 
information this country trusts is in secure hands.   
Notably, security vulnerabilities exposed by the events following the attacks on 
the United States on September 11th 2001 render this a timely topic that must bring 
information security to the forefront of our policy and processes.  Former NIPC director 
Michael A. Vatis, in Cyber attacks during the war on terrorism: A predictive analysis, 
points out: 
Malicious insiders are the greatest threat to our critical national infrastructures.  
Insiders armed with specialized knowledge of systems and privileged access are 
capable of doing great harm.  The tragedy of September 11, 2001 illustrates that 
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terrorists live and operated within the United States, obtaining specialized skills with 
deadly intentions. (Vatis, 2001, p. 18) 
Today’s news is rampant with headlines featuring discoveries of trusted insiders 
stealing information, entire hard drives, committing espionage, sabotage, and other 
deceptive behaviors.  Self- interest, broken loyalties, flexibility in moral and ethical 
decisions, and revenge are only a few of the exhibited motives.  As cultural and societal 
shifts guide the shape of information value and distribution, management must be 
prepared to change its approach to securing the information and systems trusted to those 
on the inside.   
A grave consideration must remain at the forefront of today’s IT outsourcing 
decisions: 
“The nation’s Critical National Assets are those persons, information, assets, activity, 
R&D technology, infrastructure, economic security or interests whose compromise 
will damage the survival of the United States.” 
(Robert Mueller, III, 2003) 
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